什么讓喬布斯成為億萬(wàn)富翁？答案并非蘋(píng)果！請(qǐng)看一位當(dāng)事人的精彩回憶

史蒂夫·喬布斯的名字永遠(yuǎn)地跟蘋(píng)果連在了一起：他參與創(chuàng)建了這家公司，一度被掃地出門(mén)，后來(lái)王者歸來(lái)，一手將其打造成為全球最有價(jià)值的企業(yè)。人們很容易忘記，讓他擁有第一個(gè)10億美元身家的，是另一家公司，即皮克斯動(dòng)畫(huà)工作室(Pixar)。1994年11月，當(dāng)時(shí)還寂寂無(wú)聞的喬布斯向本文作者勞倫斯·利維(Lawrence Levy)伸出橄欖枝，聘請(qǐng)其擔(dān)任皮克斯首席財(cái)務(wù)官。他肩負(fù)的使命是，幫助這家雜亂無(wú)章的公司登陸股市。

下面，我們來(lái)看看利維的回憶：

我是在1995年2月抵達(dá)皮克斯動(dòng)畫(huà)工作室的。對(duì)于我首先應(yīng)該做什么，史蒂夫并沒(méi)有提供任何指導(dǎo)。迎接我的，是皮克斯聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人埃德·卡特莫爾( Ed Catmull)。在頭幾天，他帶我參觀公司，介紹我認(rèn)識(shí)這個(gè)團(tuán)隊(duì)的關(guān)鍵成員，并描述我的職責(zé)。

每個(gè)人都很友好，熱情，用禮貌的手勢(shì)跟我打招呼，仿佛在說(shuō)：“很高興在這里見(jiàn)到你，要我?guī)兔Φ脑挘M管說(shuō)。”但我總覺(jué)得缺了點(diǎn)什么。原因是，盡管每個(gè)人都很友好和禮貌，但我也覺(jué)得他們有點(diǎn)冷漠，似乎并沒(méi)有因?yàn)槠た怂箒?lái)了一位新首席財(cái)務(wù)官而激動(dòng)萬(wàn)分。我深深地感覺(jué)到，皮克斯的警覺(jué)心很重。我不知道為什么。

沒(méi)過(guò)多久，我就發(fā)現(xiàn)了原因所在。這還得從帕姆·克爾溫(Pam Kerwin)說(shuō)起。她是皮克斯公司副總裁，主管各項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)運(yùn)營(yíng)。帕姆四十出頭，比我稍大一點(diǎn)，長(zhǎng)著一頭醒目的紅發(fā)。她說(shuō)話很甜，能夠迅速地讓身邊的其他人感到舒適自在。她的辦公室距離我很近，位于同一條走廊。帕姆是少數(shù)幾位主動(dòng)跟我打招呼，并向我介紹公司情況的人之一。

“我可不羨慕你。”一番寒暄后，帕姆直奔主題。“我覺(jué)得你真的不知道你在對(duì)抗什么。”

“對(duì)抗？”我問(wèn)。

“你是史蒂夫的人。”

我肯定在帕姆面前露出了一副非常疑惑的神情，因?yàn)槲也恢浪鞘裁匆馑肌?/p>

“皮克斯和史蒂夫打交道很久了。”她接著說(shuō)。“兩邊不是太好。你還不知道，但皮克斯的確活在對(duì)史蒂夫的恐懼中。”

Steve Jobs’ name is forever tied to Apple: the company he founded, was fired from, and later returned to and made the most valuable in the world. It’s easy to forget that it was another company—Pixar—that made him his first billion. Central to that story is Lawrence Levy, the man who Jobs reached out to, unknown, in November of 1994 and hired as CFO. His mission? To take the scrappy company public.

I arrived at Pixar in February 1995. Steve didn’t give me any specific instruction for what to do first. Ed Catmull, cofounder of Pixar, greeted me and, over the first couple of days, walked me around the company, introducing me to the key players and describing my role.

Everyone was friendly, welcoming, and greeted me with polite gestures like: “Glad you’re here, let me know if I can help.” Something was missing though. For as much as people were friendly and polite, I also felt they were a bit distant and aloof. There didn’t seem to be a lot of excitement that Pixar had a new Chief Financial Officer. I had the deep sense that Pixar’s guard was up, and I didn’t know why.

It didn’t take me long to find out. It started with Pam Kerwin, a Pixar Vice-President who was general manager of various business operations within Pixar. She was a little older than me, in her early-forties, with striking red hair and a sweet demeanor that quickly made others feel at ease around her. Her office was just down the hallway from mine, and she was one of the few people who invited me to say hello and give me the lay of the land.

“I don’t envy you,” Pam jumped in after some pleasantries, “I don’t think you really get what you’re up against.”

“Up against?” I asked.

“You’re Steve’s guy.”

I must have given Pam a terribly puzzled look, because I wasn’t sure what she meant.

“Pixar and Steve have a long history,” she went on. “Not a good one. You don’t know it yet but Pixar lives in fear of Steve.”

“怎么會(huì)呢？”

“史蒂夫不理解皮克斯。，”帕姆繼續(xù)說(shuō)道。“我們是一群渴望創(chuàng)新的藝術(shù)家，就像一個(gè)大家庭。我們相互擁抱。我們不是一個(gè)等級(jí)森嚴(yán)的組織；這里的每個(gè)人都有發(fā)言權(quán)。”

談到史蒂夫時(shí)，帕姆表現(xiàn)出的強(qiáng)烈情緒引起了我的注意。

“沒(méi)錯(cuò)，史蒂夫是我們的老板，但他從來(lái)都不是我們中的一員。”帕姆解釋說(shuō)。“我們一直覺(jué)得不受重視，不被賞識(shí)。大家擔(dān)心，如果他走得太近，他會(huì)毀掉皮克斯，并破壞我們的文化。而現(xiàn)在，你就是他派來(lái)教我們守規(guī)矩的那個(gè)人。”

這種說(shuō)法并不算離譜。我的使命正是將皮克斯改造成為一家欣欣向榮的企業(yè)。我應(yīng)該成為一股促成變革的力量。

“另外，”帕姆補(bǔ)充說(shuō)。“他沒(méi)有遵守自己的承諾，這一點(diǎn)尤其讓大家義憤填膺。”

“什么承諾？”我問(wèn)。

“股票期權(quán)。”她說(shuō)。“他答應(yīng)給我們提供股票期權(quán)，但從未兌現(xiàn)。也許你的工作之一，就是解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題。但日子就這樣一天天過(guò)去了，還是沒(méi)有一個(gè)解決方案，大家都變得更加憤世嫉俗。許多人在這里堅(jiān)守多年，一直等著拿到一點(diǎn)皮克斯的股權(quán)。他們?cè)谄渌镜呐笥讯急皇谟韫善逼跈?quán)，他們現(xiàn)在非常失望，覺(jué)得自己被利用了。”

這番話包含了很多需要我悉心領(lǐng)會(huì)的信息。當(dāng)然，它解釋了為什么我的到來(lái)并沒(méi)有受到熱烈的歡迎。

“How so?”

“Steve doesn’t get Pixar,” Pam went on. “We’re artsy and creative. We’re like a family. We hug. And we’re not a top-down organization; everyone here has a voice.”

The strength of Pam’s emotions about Steve caught my attention.

“Steve is the guy who owns us—but he’s never been one of us,” Pam explained. “We’ve long felt unvalued, unappreciated. People worry that if he gets too close, he’ll ruin Pixar, and destroy our culture. And now, you’re the guy he has sent to whip us into shape.”

That much was true. My mission was to transform Pixar into a thriving enterprise. I was supposed to be an agent of change.

“Plus,” Pam added, “He’s broken promises. And people are angry about that.”

“What promises?” I asked.

“Stock options,” she said. “He promised them to us, and they’ve never materialized. Perhaps part of your job is to fix that, but every day that passes without a solution, people grow more cynical. Many here have been waiting for years to own a little piece of Pixar. All their friends at other companies have been rewarded, and now they’re frustrated. They feel used.”

This was a lot to take in. It certainly explained why my arrival hadn’t been accompanied with much fanfare.

帕姆的訓(xùn)誡其實(shí)還把情況說(shuō)輕了。剛到皮克斯的那段日子，我看到了公司上下——特別是那些從成立之初就加盟這家動(dòng)畫(huà)工作室的資深員工——對(duì)史蒂夫抱有的深深敵意。有個(gè)人直接對(duì)我說(shuō)：“讓那人離我們遠(yuǎn)點(diǎn)。”

至少可以說(shuō)，這是一個(gè)不愿意看到的意外情況。我開(kāi)始害怕，我對(duì)史蒂夫的擔(dān)心正在變成現(xiàn)實(shí)。此前，我滿腹狐疑地接受了這份工作。盡管到目前為止，我和喬布斯相處得非常融洽，但拜他那反復(fù)無(wú)常的聲譽(yù)所賜，我認(rèn)識(shí)的大多數(shù)人都言之鑿鑿地警告我不要跟這家伙共事。更成問(wèn)題的是這家公司本身。皮克斯動(dòng)畫(huà)工作室已成立十年之久，但幾乎沒(méi)有產(chǎn)生任何影響。更有甚者，就連史蒂夫也不能清晰地闡述他對(duì)這家公司的愿景——只是說(shuō)，他不想繼續(xù)承受公司每年數(shù)的數(shù)以百萬(wàn)計(jì)美元的虧損了。

這些都是我知道的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。現(xiàn)在，作為“史蒂夫的人”，我背負(fù)著額外的負(fù)擔(dān)，被懷疑帶有某種不可告人的計(jì)劃。事實(shí)當(dāng)然不是這樣，但這也沒(méi)關(guān)系。相較于自己的預(yù)期，我將變得更加形單影只。在最初的沖擊波稍稍減退之后，直覺(jué)告訴我，我必須充分利用這一點(diǎn)。如果大家都不搭理我，我就擁有一個(gè)機(jī)遇窗口——在此期間，沒(méi)有人會(huì)對(duì)我抱有很高的期待。這反倒讓我有機(jī)會(huì)悄無(wú)聲息地探索這個(gè)神秘的“皮克斯星球”。

然而，史蒂夫不想讓我浪費(fèi)時(shí)間。他已經(jīng)在這家公司投資了近5000萬(wàn)美元，而且仍然需要填補(bǔ)皮克斯每個(gè)月的現(xiàn)金短缺。他想盡快終止這種窘境，越早越好。

“我正在專注于盡快解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題，”我告訴他。“但我需要一些時(shí)間想辦法。”盡管有點(diǎn)不耐煩，史蒂夫還是準(zhǔn)許了我的計(jì)劃。

皮克斯的員工感到像落入陷阱一樣，特別是那些供職時(shí)間最長(zhǎng)的員工。他們非常失望，覺(jué)得自己被誤導(dǎo)了——史蒂夫并沒(méi)有給予他們一種分享皮克斯成功的權(quán)利。但他們別無(wú)選擇，只能等待，因?yàn)樗麄円呀?jīng)在這家公司投入了如此多的時(shí)間。此時(shí)離開(kāi)，實(shí)屬不智，特別是考慮到《玩具總動(dòng)員》(Toy Story)發(fā)行在即。

雪上加霜的是，少數(shù)幾位公司高層已經(jīng)獲得史蒂夫的承諾：他們將有權(quán)分享皮克斯的電影利潤(rùn)，可能是以股票期權(quán)形式發(fā)放。加入該公司時(shí)，我也獲得了類似承諾，由此成為“這一小撮人”之一。除了高管，所有其他員工均被排除在外。這是一場(chǎng)正在醞釀中的災(zāi)難。大家似乎都在等待第一張多米諾骨牌倒下。皮克斯的人才或許會(huì)在一夜之間出逃殆盡——如果不是現(xiàn)在，那也是遲早的事。這家公司的創(chuàng)新能力將由此枯竭。

Pam’s admonition was, if anything, understated. In my first days at Pixar I encountered animosity directed toward Steve throughout the company, especially from those who had been there since the early days. One person said to me point blank, “Keep that man away from us.”

It was an unwelcome surprise, to say the least. I began to fear that my concerns about Steve were coming true. I had accepted the job at Pixar with a considerable amount of skepticism. Although Steve and I were getting along great so far, his mercurial reputation had made most people I knew caution me against working with him. Even more problematic was the company itself. Pixar had been in business for ten years and had made almost no impact, and even worse, not even Steve could clearly articulate what he wanted the company to be—only that he didn’t want to keep underwriting the millions of dollars it lost each year.

These were the risks I had known. Now it seemed I had the extra burden of being “Steve’s guy,” suspected of possessing some sort of hidden agenda. That wasn’t true. But that didn’t matter. I was going to be more alone than I expected. After the initial shock wore off a bit, my instinct was to figure out how to try and use this to my advantage. If people were going to leave me alone, I’d have a window of opportunity during which no one would expect much of me. That gave me a chance to quietly explore planet Pixar.

Steve, however, didn’t want me to waste time. He had invested close to $50 million in the company and was still covering Pixar’s monthly cash shortfall and he could not put an end to that soon enough.

“I’m focused on fixing that as soon as I can,” I told him, “but I need some time to figure it out.” Somewhat impatiently, Steve went along with my plan.

Pixar’s employees, especially those who had been there the longest, felt trapped. They felt let down and misled by Steve for not giving them a right to share in Pixar’s success. But they had little choice other than to wait and see what happened because they had invested so much time in the company. It would make little sense to leave now, especially when Toy Story’s release was imminent.

Making matters worse, promises had been made by Steve to a handful of Pixar’s senior team, giving them a share of Pixar’s film profits that might be converted into stock options. I was the most recent of those, having received a promise of stock options when I joined the company. Besides the top executives, everyone else was excluded. This was a disaster in the making. All it would take was one domino to fall, and an exodus of Pixar’s talent could happen overnight—if not now, later. That would spell the end of Pixar’s capacity to innovate.

在這個(gè)問(wèn)題上，我正好處于風(fēng)暴中心。一側(cè)是義憤填膺的皮克斯長(zhǎng)期員工。每每走訪皮克斯各部門(mén)時(shí)，我總能聽(tīng)到持續(xù)不斷的抱怨聲：

“史蒂夫會(huì)滿足我們的要求嗎？”

“我們已經(jīng)等了這么久了。”

“別糊弄我，眼見(jiàn)為實(shí)。”

另一側(cè)是史蒂夫。授予皮克斯員工多少期權(quán)，完全是他一個(gè)人說(shuō)了算。由于史蒂夫擁有皮克斯公司100%的股權(quán)，每一筆進(jìn)入股票期權(quán)計(jì)劃的股份都會(huì)減少他本人的持股比例，因?yàn)檫@些期權(quán)將由皮克斯的員工們來(lái)行使。

史蒂夫想盡可能少地降低他的持股比例。他考慮的是一家新成立的初創(chuàng)公司可能使用的那種股權(quán)分享比例——低至15%或20%。對(duì)于一家剛剛起步，在頭幾年預(yù)計(jì)將聘用大約50位員工的公司來(lái)說(shuō)，這個(gè)比例或許行得通。但皮克斯的員工團(tuán)隊(duì)已經(jīng)接近150人，按照硅谷標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)衡量，其中許多人都是資深老員工，有權(quán)獲得一筆數(shù)量顯著的股票期權(quán)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。

他也絕不愿冒著在未來(lái)失去公司控制權(quán)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。我沒(méi)必要追問(wèn)原因。史蒂夫想避免他此前在蘋(píng)果公司陷入的尷尬處境。他其實(shí)是被蘋(píng)果董事會(huì)掃地出門(mén)的，盡管他本人并不想走。

On this issue I was caught squarely in the middle. On the one side, Pixar’s long-time employees were angry and bitter. There were constant gripes as I made my rounds at Pixar:

“Will Steve take care of us?”

“We’ve waited a long time for this.”

“I’ll believe it when I see it.”

On the other side was Steve, who had all the power to decide how many stock options to give Pixar’s employees. Because Steve owned 100% of Pixar, every option that went into the stock option plan would reduce his personal stake in the company as those options were exercised by Pixar’s employees.

Steve wanted to reduce his share as little as possible. He had in mind the kind of percentage that a new start-up might use, as low as 15% or 20%. That might work for a company just starting out, one that might expect to hire 50 or so employees in its first couple of years. But Pixar already had close to 150 employees and many of those were seasoned veterans who, by Silicon Valley standards, were entitled to significant stock option amounts.

He was also adamant about taking no risk that he would lose control of the company in the future. I didn’t need to ask him why. He wanted to avoid any risk of being in a position like he had been in at Apple ??-0.20%? where the Board had effectively ousted him from the company against his will.

我越深入地介入這個(gè)議題，我就越覺(jué)得自己成了所有人的出氣筒：皮克斯的員工以為我是在保護(hù)史蒂夫。史蒂夫則認(rèn)為，我一門(mén)心思地為皮克斯的員工謀利益，索價(jià)太高。在內(nèi)心深處，我是站在皮克斯的員工一邊的，但這無(wú)關(guān)緊要。我的工作不是偏袒某一方，而是促成一套史蒂夫和公司其他人都能接受的解決方案。這是我第一次覺(jué)得自己在對(duì)抗史蒂夫。每當(dāng)我提出這個(gè)問(wèn)題時(shí)，他就開(kāi)始變得煩躁。

“我們已經(jīng)討論過(guò)了。”他總是這樣說(shuō)。“我只想看你提出的計(jì)劃。”但是，如果他不提供足夠的股票，我就無(wú)法制定股票期權(quán)分配計(jì)劃。

一天夜里，我向妻子希拉里抱怨說(shuō)：“喬布斯要是鐵了心，我根本說(shuō)不動(dòng)他。我們多數(shù)時(shí)候立場(chǎng)一致，但在這件事上意見(jiàn)相左，我無(wú)能為力。”

妻子說(shuō)：“你能做都做了，還能再做些什么呢？這畢竟是他的公司。”

就這樣，在伯克利山和舊金山灣之間那段漫長(zhǎng)的上下班旅程中，我始終憂心忡忡。我擔(dān)心，我們是否會(huì)被視為一家真正的娛樂(lè)公司。我擔(dān)心，迪士尼將占據(jù)皮克斯正在創(chuàng)造的空間。我擔(dān)心，一項(xiàng)新的戰(zhàn)略議程將給皮克斯的文化造成壓力。

The more I waded into this issue, the more I felt like a punching bag for everyone: Pixar’s employees thought I was protecting Steve. Steve thought I was asking for too much for Pixar’s employees. It didn’t matter that, inwardly, I sided with Pixar’s employees. My job was not to take sides but to broker a solution that would work for Steve and the rest of the company. It was the first time I felt myself pitted against Steve. He began to get irritated whenever I brought up the subject.

“We’ve already discussed it,” he would say. “Just show me the proposed plan.” But I couldn’t make an options plan without enough stock to put in it.

“When Steve digs in his heels it’s very hard to move him,” I complained to my wife Hillary one night. “Most of the time we’re on the same page, but we’re not on this one and there’s little I can do.”

“Look, if you’ve tried everything,” Hillary said, “what else can you do? It’s his company.”

And so, on my long commute between the Berkeley Hills and the San Francisco Bay, I worried. I worried about how seriously we would be taken as an entertainment company. I worried about Disney ??0.83%? claiming the space that Pixar was creating. I worried about the pressures a new strategic agenda would put on Pixar’s culture.

但最困擾我的，還是股票期權(quán)計(jì)劃。盡管這個(gè)問(wèn)題聽(tīng)上去很俗，可我相信，皮克斯的命運(yùn)在一定程度上取決于我們給股票期權(quán)池放置了多少股票。如果太少，皮克斯的關(guān)鍵員工可能會(huì)永遠(yuǎn)心存不滿，從而將毀掉這家公司賴以生存的文化。我不確定我還能史蒂夫那里“擠出”多少股票，但我需要進(jìn)行最后一次嘗試，即使這意味著招致傳說(shuō)中的史蒂夫怒火。一天晚上，我拿起電話，撥通了他的號(hào)碼。

“我們必須增加更多的股票期權(quán)。”我直截了當(dāng)?shù)卣f(shuō)。“僅憑我們已經(jīng)分配的數(shù)量是辦不成事的，這個(gè)數(shù)字不夠。要是再增加幾個(gè)百分點(diǎn)，我們就能?chē)L試一下。即使我們上市后，你仍然有很大的機(jī)會(huì)保持公司的控股權(quán)。”

“我說(shuō)過(guò)我不想再討論這個(gè)。”史蒂夫抱怨道。眼看著他要掛電話，我提出了一個(gè)數(shù)字。我認(rèn)為，這可能是他愿意做出的最大讓步了。

“就是這個(gè)數(shù)字嗎？”史蒂夫完全被激怒了。“這個(gè)期權(quán)數(shù)字是否足以延續(xù)很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間？”

我認(rèn)為它不會(huì)。這個(gè)數(shù)字現(xiàn)在勉強(qiáng)可以滿足我們的需要。

“是的。”我有點(diǎn)沒(méi)底氣地宣稱。“我們將讓它發(fā)揮作用。”

“那么，我不想再聽(tīng)到這個(gè)話題了。”就這樣，史蒂夫徑直結(jié)束了這場(chǎng)對(duì)話。

我如釋重負(fù)地長(zhǎng)嘆一聲。我終于獲得了第一個(gè)真正的立足點(diǎn)。這項(xiàng)期權(quán)計(jì)劃是推動(dòng)皮克斯向前發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵所在。但現(xiàn)在，它的利害關(guān)系比以往任何時(shí)候都要高。在未來(lái)某一天，這些股票期權(quán)需要特別值錢(qián)才行。對(duì)于任何人來(lái)說(shuō)，一場(chǎng)小勝都無(wú)法“解渴”。皮克斯正在謀求巨大的成功。

史蒂夫曾經(jīng)告訴我，孕育偉大的產(chǎn)品往往需要花費(fèi)比看起來(lái)長(zhǎng)得多的時(shí)間。每一款似乎從天而降的產(chǎn)品，其實(shí)都經(jīng)歷過(guò)一個(gè)長(zhǎng)期的研發(fā)、試驗(yàn)和失誤的過(guò)程。如果有什么東西能證明這一點(diǎn)，那就是皮克斯。《玩具總動(dòng)員》(Toy Story)的孕育期可以追溯到16年前。彼時(shí)的皮克斯還是盧卡斯電影公司(Lucas Film)的電腦繪圖部門(mén)。自那時(shí)起，這家動(dòng)畫(huà)工作室就一直走在一條漫長(zhǎng)而艱辛的道路上，經(jīng)歷過(guò)似乎沒(méi)有盡頭的挑戰(zhàn)。頗具諷刺意味的是，在1995年11月份的一個(gè)星期，決定皮克斯命運(yùn)的，僅僅是兩個(gè)數(shù)字：《玩具總動(dòng)員》首映周末的票房收入，以及皮克斯的IPO發(fā)行價(jià)。

第一個(gè)數(shù)字，即《玩具總動(dòng)員》首映周末的票房收入，將告訴我們這部電影的整體表現(xiàn)究竟會(huì)有多好。該片擬定于1995年11月22日，也就是感恩節(jié)前的那個(gè)周三正式發(fā)布。迪斯尼告訴我們，僅僅基于那一周的周五晚的票房，他們就能非常準(zhǔn)確地預(yù)測(cè)其首映周末的票房收入——實(shí)際上也是該片的的整體表現(xiàn)。

這意味著，經(jīng)歷了如此多年的科技進(jìn)步，以及《玩具總動(dòng)員》長(zhǎng)達(dá)4年的制作期之后，皮克斯將在11月份一個(gè)星期五的晚上，獲悉全世界對(duì)其工作的終極評(píng)價(jià)。它讓我想起了奧運(yùn)會(huì)上的100米短跑比賽。每位運(yùn)動(dòng)員都懷抱著成為世界上跑得最快的人這一夢(mèng)想，并為此付出了終生的努力。但一切的一切都取決于他們?cè)诙潭?0秒內(nèi)的表現(xiàn)。如果全世界都愛(ài)看《玩具總動(dòng)員》，皮克斯將有機(jī)會(huì)開(kāi)創(chuàng)一個(gè)動(dòng)畫(huà)娛樂(lè)的新時(shí)代。否則的話，皮克斯可能會(huì)消失在歷史的塵埃中，成為另一家曾經(jīng)努力嘗試但從未成功過(guò)的公司。

一個(gè)周六下午，當(dāng)我和史蒂夫在帕洛阿爾托一起散步的時(shí)候，他問(wèn)我，“首映周末票房達(dá)到什么數(shù)字，會(huì)讓你真正感到滿意？”

“最好能超過(guò)1000萬(wàn)美元。”我說(shuō)。“哪怕首映周末票房達(dá)到800萬(wàn)，我們?nèi)匀粯?lè)于接受。”

“我的期望值是1500萬(wàn)。”史蒂夫說(shuō)。“如果我們達(dá)到1500萬(wàn)到2000萬(wàn)，那就預(yù)示著國(guó)內(nèi)總票房將突破1億美元。從此以后，就沒(méi)有人會(huì)質(zhì)疑皮克斯時(shí)代的到來(lái)。

我們無(wú)數(shù)次地探討過(guò)相同的話題。我們喜歡猜測(cè)《玩具總動(dòng)員》的票房潛力，以及它的含義。1億美元的國(guó)內(nèi)票房（意指《玩具總動(dòng)員》在北美市場(chǎng)的全部銷(xiāo)售收入），實(shí)在是一個(gè)不敢相信的甜蜜畫(huà)面。在電影行業(yè)，這是一個(gè)神奇但很難實(shí)現(xiàn)的數(shù)字。于動(dòng)畫(huà)片而言，尤為如此。回顧整個(gè)電影史，只有4部動(dòng)畫(huà)故事片的國(guó)內(nèi)票房超過(guò)1億美元，它們都是迪士尼電影：《美女與野獸》(Beauty and the Beast)、《阿拉丁》(Aladdin)、《獅子王》(The Lion King)和《風(fēng)中奇緣》(Pocahontas)。如果不考慮這幾部迪士尼大片，各大電影公司和知名獨(dú)立制作商在過(guò)去5年共發(fā)行了17部動(dòng)畫(huà)故事片，其平均國(guó)內(nèi)票房還不及1400萬(wàn)美元。請(qǐng)注意，這是國(guó)內(nèi)總票房，而不是首映周末票房。50多年以來(lái)，迪士尼其實(shí)是動(dòng)畫(huà)故事片領(lǐng)域的唯一玩家。

But it was the stock options that bothered me the most. As mundane an issue as it might seem, I believed that Pixar’s fate hung partially in the balance of how much stock we put in the stock option pool. Too little, and Pixar’s key employees might be forever disgruntled, ruining the culture on which Pixar’s was built. I wasn’t sure I had anything further I could squeeze out of Steve but I needed to take one more final swing at it, even if it meant incurring Steve’s legendary wrath. I picked up the phone one night and called him.

“We have to add more stock options,” I said flatly. “We can’t make it on the amount we have allocated right now. It’s not enough. A few percent more, and we can give it a shot, and still have a good chance you’ll maintain control of the company even after we go public.”

“I said I didn’t want to revisit this.” Steve griped. He was on the verge of dismissing it. I suggested a number. It was as far as I thought he might go.

“Will this be it?” Steve asked, totally exasperated. “Will this be enough options to last for a long while?”

I didn’t think it would be. It would barely get us by now.

“Yes,” I declared with unfounded confidence. “We’ll make it work.”

“Then I don’t want to hear about it again.” And with that, Steve ended the conversation.

I breathed a deep sigh of relief. I at last had my first real toe hold. The option plan was pivotal to moving Pixar forward. But now the stakes were higher than ever. Those stock options needed to be worth a lot one day. A small win wouldn’t cut it for anyone. Pixar was aiming for the big time.

Steve once told me that the gestation of great products takes much longer than it appears. What seems to emerge from nowhere belies a long process of development, trials, and missteps. If anything proved that case, it was Pixar. The gestation of Toy Story could be traced back 16 years to when Pixar had been the computer graphics division at Lucas Film. It had been a long and arduous path since then, with no end of challenges. This made it especially ironic that, in one week in November of 1995, Pixar’s entire future would depend on just two numbers: the opening weekend box office for Toy Story, and the price at which Pixar’s shares sold in its IPO.

The first number, the opening weekend box office for Toy Story, would tell us how well Toy Story would perform overall. Scheduled for release on November 22, 1995, the Wednesday before Thanksgiving, Disney told us it could make a good prediction of the opening weekend box office, and indeed the film’s overall performance, solely on the basis of that week’s Friday night box office.

This meant that, after all those years of evolving the technology and then four more years of actually making Toy Story, Pixar would learn on a single Friday night in November what the world thought of its work. It reminded me of the 100-meter sprint in the Olympic games. A lifetime of training to become the fastest runner in the world came down to a single ten-second performance. If the world fell in love with Toy Story, Pixar would have a chance to usher in a new era of animated entertainment. If it didn’t, Pixar might be written off as another company that tried but never quite hit the mark.

“What opening weekend box office would make you feel really good?” Steve asked me as we were taking a walk in Palo Alto one Saturday afternoon.

“Anything above ten million,” I said, “Even If we hit eight million we’re on the board.”

“My number’s fifteen,” Steve said. “If we hit fifteen to twenty, they’ll project a total domestic box office of over a hundred million. Then no one will question Pixar’s arrival.”

This was the umpteenth time we’d had this same discussion. We loved to speculate about Toy Story’s box office potential and what it meant. A domestic box office run—meaning the total North American ticket sales for Toy Story—of a hundred million would be sweet indeed. It was a magic number in the film business, and very difficult to achieve, even more so in animation. In all of film history, only four animated feature films had a domestic box office greater than a hundred million, and all of those had been made by Disney: Beauty and the Beast, Aladdin, The Lion King, and Pocahontas. If you excluded the four Disney blockbusters, of the 17 other animated feature films released by major studios or well known independents over the past five years, the average domestic box office was a little under $14 million. That’s total domestic box office, not the opening weekend. In animation, for all practical purposes, Disney had been the only game in town for over fifty years.

無(wú)論以什么尺度來(lái)衡量，我們都是要一飛沖天。

第二個(gè)將決定皮克斯未來(lái)的數(shù)字是，作為一家上市公司，皮克斯股票將以什么價(jià)格開(kāi)始交易。在所有關(guān)于上市的議題中，史蒂夫思考最多的莫過(guò)于皮克斯的IPO發(fā)行價(jià)。

基于皮克斯已有的股票總數(shù)來(lái)計(jì)算，如果每股的交易價(jià)格為10美元，皮克斯的市值將達(dá)到3.7億美元左右，史蒂夫擁有的80%股權(quán)將價(jià)值約3億美元。不難推算，如果發(fā)行價(jià)為20美元，公司市值將達(dá)到7.4億，史蒂夫的股權(quán)將價(jià)值6億美元。換言之，皮克斯首個(gè)交易日的收盤(pán)價(jià)不僅象征著史蒂夫王者歸來(lái)，它還會(huì)實(shí)實(shí)在在地量化他的身價(jià)。

“我們比網(wǎng)景更有價(jià)值。”一天晚上，史蒂夫在電話中斷言稱。“他們只成立了大約一年光景，而且一直在賠錢(qián)。如果皮克斯的電影大賣(mài)，我們將賺取遠(yuǎn)高于他們的收入。我們理應(yīng)更值錢(qián)。”

當(dāng)網(wǎng)景股票于8月9日上市交易時(shí)，該公司的估值略高于10億美元。當(dāng)天收盤(pán)時(shí)，網(wǎng)景的市值超過(guò)20億美元。在我看來(lái)，無(wú)論怎么算，皮克斯的市值也不可能達(dá)到20億美元。

“這樣做的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)太大了。”我試圖反駁。“網(wǎng)景是這幾年最大的一波IPO狂潮。如果我們參照它的IPO發(fā)行價(jià)，我們可能會(huì)徹底玩完。我們最好還是審慎行事，讓投資者開(kāi)心，給股票留些增長(zhǎng)的勢(shì)頭。”

最終，我們聘請(qǐng)的投資銀行家給出了他們自己的判決。他們認(rèn)為，皮克斯的股價(jià)可能會(huì)迅速地在十八九美元拉平，這家公司的市值將由此達(dá)到7億美元左右。他們希望IPO價(jià)格確定在12到14美元之間。這個(gè)擬定的發(fā)行價(jià)意味著皮克斯的估值在5億美元左右，這是一個(gè)極其可觀的數(shù)字。但它需要得到史蒂夫的認(rèn)同。

“如果我們以12到14美元的發(fā)行價(jià)，向美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)提出上市申請(qǐng)。”我告訴他。“如果路演進(jìn)展順利，我們可以把發(fā)行價(jià)翻一番，就像網(wǎng)景那樣。這樣一來(lái)，皮克斯的估值將達(dá)到10億美元。我們不妨一試，但如果我們的定價(jià)保守一些，讓市場(chǎng)充當(dāng)裁判，我們承受的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就會(huì)小得多。所有銀行家都贊成這套方案。我也一樣。”

“讓我想想。”史蒂夫說(shuō)。

幾個(gè)小時(shí)后，他打電話給我。

“就這么辦。”他說(shuō)。“我認(rèn)為，我們的路演結(jié)束將激發(fā)起極大的認(rèn)購(gòu)熱情，我們隨后將把開(kāi)盤(pán)價(jià)翻一番。”

我如釋重負(fù)地長(zhǎng)嘆一口氣。我們終于有了一個(gè)起點(diǎn)。

11月26日，周六。早晨起床后，我坐立難安，唯有不停地踱步。我們已經(jīng)安排了一連串電話。我們將獲悉《玩具總動(dòng)員》在周五晚間的票房表現(xiàn)。我會(huì)接到薩拉·斯塔夫(Sarah Staff)的電話，她是皮克斯公司的票房線人。

“你什么時(shí)候會(huì)收到消息？”希拉里問(wèn)。

“他們說(shuō)上午10點(diǎn)左右。”我回答道。

現(xiàn)在已接近10點(diǎn)半。我們隨時(shí)都會(huì)知道第一個(gè)神奇的數(shù)字，即《玩具總動(dòng)員》首映周末票房。我樂(lè)意接受自己的期望值：1000萬(wàn)美元，但如果首映周末票房超過(guò)1500萬(wàn)，那簡(jiǎn)直美得不敢想。

“我很緊張。”希拉里說(shuō)。

20分鐘后，電話鈴響了。我急忙沖過(guò)去接聽(tīng)。

“是，是。我明白，知道了。謝謝。是的，我喜歡細(xì)節(jié)。你有我的傳真號(hào)碼。謝謝你。”

我掛了電話，嘗試著吸收我剛剛被告知的那個(gè)數(shù)字。

“怎么樣？”希拉里等不及了。

“天哪！”我說(shuō)。“非常高。他們不相信這是真的。迪斯尼預(yù)計(jì)，周末票房將接近3000萬(wàn)美元！僅周五晚的票房就接近1150萬(wàn)。”

“哇！”希拉里驚呼。我們高高地舉起手，擊掌相慶。

“3000萬(wàn)！”我繼續(xù)驚嘆。“錦上添花的是，觀眾投票人數(shù)打破記錄。迪士尼認(rèn)為這部電影將大賣(mài)。總票房將輕松突破1億大關(guān)，有可能超過(guò)1.5億。”

5分鐘后，電話又響了。是史蒂夫。

“太好了。”史蒂夫興奮難耐。“我剛剛征求了迪士尼營(yíng)銷(xiāo)團(tuán)隊(duì)的看法，也跟迪士尼的高管談過(guò)。這是一個(gè)大數(shù)字。他們現(xiàn)在認(rèn)為，這部電影有可能會(huì)成為最賣(mài)座的電影。”

當(dāng)時(shí)票房最高的電影是《永遠(yuǎn)的蝙蝠俠》(Batman Forever)，其國(guó)內(nèi)總票房達(dá)到1.84億美元。第二名是獲得1.72億美元票房的《阿波羅13號(hào)》(Apollo 13)。我們竟然有可能沖入這一區(qū)域，這超出了所有人最大膽的想象。

“你是認(rèn)真的嗎？”我說(shuō)。這意味著，《玩具總動(dòng)員》的總票房將接近2億美元。

“有可能。”史蒂夫說(shuō)。“我們做到了，勞倫斯。我們完全做到了。”

1995年11月29日，皮克斯以每股22美元的價(jià)格上市交易。當(dāng)日收盤(pán)價(jià)高達(dá)39美元，這家新公司的市值由此達(dá)到15億美元。一周前發(fā)行，制作成本約3000萬(wàn)美元的《玩具總動(dòng)員》最終斬獲3.65億美元的全球票房收入。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

本文摘自《我的皮克斯往事：與喬布斯攜手創(chuàng)造娛樂(lè)業(yè)歷史的非凡之旅》(To Pixar and Beyond: My Unlikely Journey With Steve Jobs to Make Entertainment History)，勞倫斯·利維著，將于2016年11月1日出版。

譯者：Kevin

No matter how we measured it, we were reaching for the sky.

The second number that would define Pixar’s future was the price Pixar’s stock would first start trading at as a public company. Of all the issues in Pixar’s public offering, there was none that occupied Steve’s thinking more than what Pixar’s stock would sell for when it first went public.

Given the total number of shares of Pixar stock that existed, if Pixar’s stock traded at $10 per share, Pixar would be worth about $370 million, and Steve’s eighty percent share around $300 million. If it traded at $20 per share, Pixar would be worth $740 million and Steve’s portion around $600 million. In other words, Pixar’s stock price at the end of its first day of trading would not just signify Steve’s comeback, it would truly quantify it.

“We’re worth more than Netscape,” Steve asserted one evening when we were talking over the phone. “They’ve only been around about a year, and are losing money. If Pixar’s films are hits, we’ll make more than them. We should be worth more.”

Netscape had been valued at a little over $1 billion when its stock begun to trade on August 9. By the end of that day, it was worth over $2 billion. In my mind, no amount of number crunching could get Pixar to a value of $2 billion.

“It’s a huge risk,” I tried to push back. “If we model our IPO on Netscape, the biggest IPO frenzy in years, we might blow the whole thing. We’re better off getting out the gate, keeping investors happy, and letting the stock build momentum.”

Eventually our investment bankers came up with their own verdict. They thought Pixar’s stock might quickly level out in the high teens, giving Pixar a value of around $700 million. They wanted the initial price to be $12 – $14 per share, meaning the proposed price would value Pixar around $500 million, an enormously respectable number. But Steve needed to be on board.

“If we start at $12 – $14 when we file with the SEC,” I told him, “and if the road show goes well we could double it, just like Netscape did. If we double it, Pixar will be valued at a billion dollars. We’ll have a shot, but we take much less risk starting conservatively and letting the market be the judge. All the bankers are on board. Me too.”

“Let me think about it,” Steve said.

A couple of hours later he called me.

“We’ll go with it,” he said. “I think we’ll have so much interest after our road show that we’ll double the opening price.”

I breathed a huge sigh of relief. We had our starting place.

On the morning of Saturday, November 26, all I could do was pace. We had arranged a chain of phone calls through which we would know how well Toy Story had performed Friday night. I would receive a phone call from Sarah Staff, who was plugged into Pixar’s source of box office information.

“When will you hear?” Hillary asked.

“They said by around 10 a.m.,” I replied.

It was now approaching 10:30. It would only be moments before we knew the first magic number, that of Toy Story’s opening weekend box office. I’d take $10 million I reminded myself, but something north of $15 million would be very sweet indeed.

“I’m nervous,” Hillary said.

Twenty minutes later, the phone rang. I rushed to answer it.

“Yes, yes. I see. I get it. Thank you. Yes, I’d love the details. You have my fax number. Thank you.”

I hung up the phone, trying to absorb what I had just been told.

“So?” Hillary couldn’t wait.

“It’s massive,” I said. “Massive. They didn’t believe it was possible. Disney predicts a weekend box office close to $30 million! Friday night’s box office alone was close to eleven and a half million.”

“Wow!” Hillary exclaimed. We high fived.

“$30 million!” I continued. “Even more, audience polling is off the charts. Disney thinks the film will have a huge run. It will sail past $100 million, and probably past 150.”

Five minutes later the phone rang again. It was Steve.

“It’s amazing,” Steve started excitedly. “I’ve talked to Disney marketing, I’ve talked to John. I’ve talked to Eisner. This is huge. They’re thinking this could be the biggest film of the year.”

The biggest film of the year had been Batman Forever, with a total domestic box office of $184 million. Second was Apollo 13, with $172 million. It had never really occurred to any of us that we might reach into that territory.

“Are you serious?” I said. That means it’ll get close to $200 million.”

“It’s possible,” Steve said. “We did it, Lawrence. We totally did it.”

Epilogue: On Nov. 29, 1995, Pixar shares were offered to the public at $22 a share. By close of market, shares were trading at $39, valuing the new company at $1.5 billion. Toy Story, made for around $30 million and released a week earlier, went on to gross $365 million in global box office sales.

Excerpted from “To Pixar and Beyond: My Unlikely Journey With Steve Jobs to Make Entertainment History,” by Lawrence Levy, to be published by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt on Nov. 1, 2016. ?2016 by Lawrence Levy.