醒醒吧，歐洲！這次該動真格的了！

????存款外流這個問題很難解決，因為在歐元區，要將希臘銀行中的存款轉到其他銀行太容易了。將資金轉到另一個歐元區國家不存在任何的匯率或利率風險，所有國家執行同一貨幣政策。即便希臘政府實施限制存款的資本管制措施，資金仍能流到其他歐元區銀行。

????而且，即便蒙蒂的計劃以某種方式獲得批準，平息了當前的恐慌情緒，可能也無法截斷希臘存款緩慢外流到歐元區核心成員國的過程。如果資本持續外流，希臘銀行狀況堪憂。而且最重要的是，只有希臘銀行愿意貸款給希臘人，這基本上扼殺了這個國家經濟增長的希望。

????法國新任總統弗朗西斯?奧朗德支持蒙蒂的計劃，但周三他將忙于推進自己的議程。除了銀行存款保障計劃，奧朗德希望建立統一的債券工具——由歐洲央行發行，并由歐元區所有17個成員國共同擔保的歐元債券。

????歐元債券將有效緩解外圍國家的風險，將其轉移至核心成員國。它將允許外圍國家以遠低于當前主權債券發行利率的水平借入更多現金。歐元債券將由歐洲央行持有，因此不會增加外圍國家的債務和負擔。這些債券將為多種用途提供資金，從意大利和希臘的財政赤字到法國、西班牙的大型資本項目不等。

????德國和其他財政謹慎的歐元區成員國一直強烈反對共擔債務機制，因為它們會立刻受累于此。在外圍國家借貸成本下降的同時，核心成員國的借貸成本將上升。別指望德國會在對資金用途毫無發言權的情況下，任由外圍國家用德國的良好信用和資產負債表為其買單。

????兩個計劃看來大方向都正確，但鑒于歐元區當前的狀況，它們成功實施的機會渺茫。歐元區成員國大多都難以接受成員國之間風險和責任的轉移，它們可以清楚地看到這種一體化對本國經濟的負面影響。因此要想所有成員國都能舉手贊成，外圍國家也需要將權力移交給核心成員國。

????德國提供了一個很好的例子。1990年西德合并東德，權力交給了西德，資金轉到了東德。為此，西德經歷了十年的緩慢增長期，因為過去用于西德的資金被用于東德重建。但這一犧牲看來是值得的，因為合并后的德國大大提高了生產率，也給原西德很多公司提供了令人振奮的商機。

????但設想一下，假如東德既想要錢、要支持，又想保持自身財政政策的獨立。西德將數十億的資金轉至東德就能讓它恢復活力嗎？肯定不會。

????因此，毫不奇怪，德國并不熱衷于犧牲自己的信用和經濟增長來幫助提振歐元區外圍經濟體。德國和其他富有的歐元區成員國需要看到一些好處來證明承擔如此龐大的債務和風險是值得的。空口承諾財政自律不管用了——歐洲這次必須面對現實了。

????譯者：早稻米

????There is no easy fix to this problem. It is simply too easy to move a deposit from a Greek bank to another bank in the eurozone. There is no exchange-rate or interest rate risk in moving funds to another eurozone nation, since they all share the same monetary policy. Even if the Greek government instituted capital controls limiting deposits, money could still flow to other eurozone banks.

????Furthermore, even if Monti's plan somehow gets approved and quells the current panic, it probably won't stop the slow leak of Greek deposits to core eurozone members. If the capital flight continues, Greek banks will be crippled. And since, for the most part, only Greek banks are willing to lend to Greeks, it basically dooms any hope of economic growth in the country.

????Francois Hollande, France's new president, supports Monti's plan, but he will be busy pushing his own agenda on Wednesday. In addition to a bank deposit scheme, Hollande wants to create a common debt instrument, which would be issued by the ECB and backed by all 17 members of the eurozone -- the eurobond.

????The eurobond would effectively mitigate risk at the periphery by transferring it to the core. This allows countries on the periphery to borrow more cash at much lower rates than they currently can through issuing sovereign debt. The eurobond debt would be held at the ECB, so it won't add to the debts and burdens of the peripheral nations. The bonds could end up funding anything from fiscal deficits in Italy and Greece to large capital projects in France and Spain.

????Germany and the other fiscally prudent eurozone members have been vehemently opposed to the idea of a shared debt instrument. After all, they would turn out to be the instant loser in the deal. While borrowing costs would drop at the periphery, they would go up at the core. Germany cannot be expected to simply let the periphery use its good credit and its balance sheet to run up a tab without any say as to what the money is being used for.

????Both plans seem to be steps in the right direction, but they have a slim chance of being implemented successfully given the state of the eurozone today. The transferring of risk and liabilities between member states will be a hard pill to swallow for many eurozone members who could see their economies negatively impacted by the unification. To get all the members to buy in will therefore require a transfer of power from the periphery to the core.

????Germany provides a good example of such a trade-off. In 1990, when West Germany absorbed East Germany, power was transferred to the west and money was transferred to the east. As a result, the west experienced a decade of sluggish growth as cash that would have been used in the west went to go rebuild the east. The sacrifice, though, seems to have been worth it as the country has become more productive than ever. It also offered many exciting business opportunities for West German companies.

????But imagine if East Germany wanted the money and support but also wanted to remain independent with its own fiscal policies. Would West Germany still transfer billions to help the east get back on its feet? Surely not.

????It should therefore come as no surprise that Germany isn't too keen on smudging up its credit and taking hits to its growth rate to help lift up the eurozone periphery. Germany and the other wealthy eurozone members need some upside to justify taking on such a massive amount of debt and risk. Promises of maintaining fiscal discipline simply won't do anymore – it's time for Europe to get real.