
OpenAI及其ChatGPT雖然取得了現象級成功,卻至今未能盈利。盡管至今仍未上市,但OpenAI的這一困境在2025年下半年持續困擾著市場。英偉達 (Nvidia) 在11月再次交出亮眼季度財報,但是關于人工智能存在泡沫的討論仍未平息。問題依然在于:一方面,ChatGPT對遍布經濟各處的數據中心所提供的“算力”有著看似無止境的需求;另一方面,OpenAI需要將其商業模式扭虧為盈。OpenAI首席執行官薩姆·奧爾特曼 (Sam Altman) 在最近的一次播客露面中,僅用一個詞就回答了這個問題:“夠了。”
投行匯豐 (HSBC) 雖然明確表示仍相信人工智能處于“超級周期”,且其預測“從營收角度看,OpenAI將處于領先地位”,但同時也測算出,若該公司要實現其雄心壯志,將面臨巨大的財務壓力。匯豐全球投資研究部 (HSBC Global Investment Research) 預測,即使到2030年其用戶群將增長至約占全球成年人口的44%(高于2025年的10%),OpenAI屆時仍將無法盈利。此外,為跟上其增長計劃,它還需要至少額外2070億美元的算力投入。這一嚴峻的評估反映了飆升的基礎設施成本、日益激烈的競爭,以及一個需求激增且資金密集程度超越歷史上任何技術趨勢的人工智能市場。
由尼古拉斯·科特-科利松 (Nicolas Cote-Colisson) 領導的匯豐半導體分析師團隊,通過自10月中旬以來首次更新其OpenAI預測得出了這一數據,其中考慮了近期達成的多年期云計算承諾,包括與微軟的2500億美元協議和與亞馬遜的380億美元交易。更重要的是,匯豐指出,這些交易均未涉及新的資本注入,并且是OpenAI一系列產能擴張中的最新舉措,該公司目前的目標是到本十年末實現36吉瓦的AI算力。假設1吉瓦電力大約能為75萬戶家庭供電,如此規模的電力需求相當于一個比得克薩斯州稍小、比佛羅里達州稍大的州的用電量。此前報道過匯豐預測的《金融時報》Alphaville博客將OpenAI描述為“一個頂著網站名頭的資金黑洞”。
匯豐預測,到2030年,OpenAI的累計自由現金流仍將為負值,留下2070億美元的資金缺口,必須通過額外債務、股權融資或更激進的創收手段來填補。匯豐分析師模擬得出,從2025年末到2030年,OpenAI的云和AI基礎設施成本將達到7920億美元,到2033年算力總投入將達到1.4萬億美元(匯豐指出,奧爾特曼已制定了一項未來八年投入1.4萬億美元用于算力的計劃)。僅數據中心租賃費用一項就將高達6200億美元。
盡管預計營收將快速增長——到2030年將超過2130億美元——但這仍不足以彌合這一差距。(該行的營收預測基于以下假設:中期付費訂閱用戶比例將提高,以及大型語言模型提供商將搶占部分數字廣告市場份額。)
該行指出了幾種彌補缺口的方案,包括大幅提高付費訂閱用戶比例(從10%提高到20%可能增加1940億美元營收);搶占更大份額的數字廣告支出;或者從算力運營中榨取非凡效率。但即使在樂觀的用戶轉化和貨幣化情景下,該公司在2030年之后仍需要新的資本。
OpenAI的生存與其財務支持者和AI生態系統緊密相連。微軟和亞馬遜不僅是云提供商,也是主要投資者,而像甲骨文、英偉達和超微半導體 (AMD) 這樣的云參與者,其得失都將取決于OpenAI的命運。然而,風險也相當大:未經證實的營收模式;AI訂閱服務的潛在市場飽和;監管審查的威脅;以及必要資本注入的巨大規模。
匯豐指出,OpenAI可以籌集更多債務來滿足其算力需求,但這“在當前市場環境下可能是最具挑戰性的途徑”,因為甲骨文和Meta最近已經籌集了“巨額”債務來為AI相關的資本支出融資,“引發了市場對AI整體融資情況的擔憂”。該行指出,這是個例外,因為正如摩根大通的邁克爾·塞姆巴萊斯特(Michael Cembalest)最近指出的,大多數所謂的超大規模公司都依靠自由現金流為自己融資。匯豐還注意到,近日甲骨文的信用違約互換(CDS)出現“急劇上升”,幾周前摩根士丹利的麗莎·沙萊特 (Lisa Shalett)在接受《財富》雜志采訪時就對此發出了警告。
與許多其他撰文論述AI革命的銀行一樣,匯豐再次引用了諾貝爾獎得主羅伯特·索洛 (Robert Solow) 的名言:“除了生產率統計數據,你在任何地方都能看到計算機時代”,并冷靜地指出:“由疲軟的全要素(勞動力和資本)生產率驅動的低生產率增長,是當今發達經濟體的一個不幸特征。”事實上,該行指出,一些人甚至對已有30年歷史的互聯網革命本身是否帶來了有意義的回報表示懷疑,并引用了美聯儲主席約翰·威廉姆斯 (John Williams) 2017年的評論:“互聯網等現代技術帶來的生產率提升,迄今為止只影響了我們的休閑消費——尚未滲透到辦公室或工廠。”
美國銀行美國股票與量化策略主管薩維塔·蘇布拉曼尼亞 (Savita Subramanian) 在八月告訴《財富》雜志,她認為2020年代的經濟正在出現生產率的“巨變”,但這在本質上并非由AI驅動。她表示,在包括疫情后工資通脹在內的多種因素共同作用下,企業被迫“用更少的人做更多的事”,以可擴展且有意義的方式用流程取代人力。然而,令她猶豫的一個考慮因素是,從輕資產模式向更側重重資產模式的轉變,因為許多最具創新力的科技公司發現,他們對一種伴隨巨大風險的硬件——數據中心——有著近乎無法滿足的渴求。
幾個月后,哈佛大學經濟學家杰森·福爾曼 (Jason Furman) 做了一項粗略估算,發現若沒有數據中心,2025年上半年的GDP增長率將僅為0.1%。OpenAI似乎向市場提出了一個問題:建立在AI未來回報和生產力革命——這些遠非板上釘釘之事——之上的增長,究竟能持續多久?(財富中文網)
譯者:中慧言-王芳
OpenAI及其ChatGPT雖然取得了現象級成功,卻至今未能盈利。盡管至今仍未上市,但OpenAI的這一困境在2025年下半年持續困擾著市場。英偉達 (Nvidia) 在11月再次交出亮眼季度財報,但是關于人工智能存在泡沫的討論仍未平息。問題依然在于:一方面,ChatGPT對遍布經濟各處的數據中心所提供的“算力”有著看似無止境的需求;另一方面,OpenAI需要將其商業模式扭虧為盈。OpenAI首席執行官薩姆·奧爾特曼 (Sam Altman) 在最近的一次播客露面中,僅用一個詞就回答了這個問題:“夠了。”
投行匯豐 (HSBC) 雖然明確表示仍相信人工智能處于“超級周期”,且其預測“從營收角度看,OpenAI將處于領先地位”,但同時也測算出,若該公司要實現其雄心壯志,將面臨巨大的財務壓力。匯豐全球投資研究部 (HSBC Global Investment Research) 預測,即使到2030年其用戶群將增長至約占全球成年人口的44%(高于2025年的10%),OpenAI屆時仍將無法盈利。此外,為跟上其增長計劃,它還需要至少額外2070億美元的算力投入。這一嚴峻的評估反映了飆升的基礎設施成本、日益激烈的競爭,以及一個需求激增且資金密集程度超越歷史上任何技術趨勢的人工智能市場。
由尼古拉斯·科特-科利松 (Nicolas Cote-Colisson) 領導的匯豐半導體分析師團隊,通過自10月中旬以來首次更新其OpenAI預測得出了這一數據,其中考慮了近期達成的多年期云計算承諾,包括與微軟的2500億美元協議和與亞馬遜的380億美元交易。更重要的是,匯豐指出,這些交易均未涉及新的資本注入,并且是OpenAI一系列產能擴張中的最新舉措,該公司目前的目標是到本十年末實現36吉瓦的AI算力。假設1吉瓦電力大約能為75萬戶家庭供電,如此規模的電力需求相當于一個比得克薩斯州稍小、比佛羅里達州稍大的州的用電量。此前報道過匯豐預測的《金融時報》Alphaville博客將OpenAI描述為“一個頂著網站名頭的資金黑洞”。
匯豐預測,到2030年,OpenAI的累計自由現金流仍將為負值,留下2070億美元的資金缺口,必須通過額外債務、股權融資或更激進的創收手段來填補。匯豐分析師模擬得出,從2025年末到2030年,OpenAI的云和AI基礎設施成本將達到7920億美元,到2033年算力總投入將達到1.4萬億美元(匯豐指出,奧爾特曼已制定了一項未來八年投入1.4萬億美元用于算力的計劃)。僅數據中心租賃費用一項就將高達6200億美元。
盡管預計營收將快速增長——到2030年將超過2130億美元——但這仍不足以彌合這一差距。(該行的營收預測基于以下假設:中期付費訂閱用戶比例將提高,以及大型語言模型提供商將搶占部分數字廣告市場份額。)
該行指出了幾種彌補缺口的方案,包括大幅提高付費訂閱用戶比例(從10%提高到20%可能增加1940億美元營收);搶占更大份額的數字廣告支出;或者從算力運營中榨取非凡效率。但即使在樂觀的用戶轉化和貨幣化情景下,該公司在2030年之后仍需要新的資本。
OpenAI的生存與其財務支持者和AI生態系統緊密相連。微軟和亞馬遜不僅是云提供商,也是主要投資者,而像甲骨文、英偉達和超微半導體 (AMD) 這樣的云參與者,其得失都將取決于OpenAI的命運。然而,風險也相當大:未經證實的營收模式;AI訂閱服務的潛在市場飽和;監管審查的威脅;以及必要資本注入的巨大規模。
匯豐指出,OpenAI可以籌集更多債務來滿足其算力需求,但這“在當前市場環境下可能是最具挑戰性的途徑”,因為甲骨文和Meta最近已經籌集了“巨額”債務來為AI相關的資本支出融資,“引發了市場對AI整體融資情況的擔憂”。該行指出,這是個例外,因為正如摩根大通的邁克爾·塞姆巴萊斯特(Michael Cembalest)最近指出的,大多數所謂的超大規模公司都依靠自由現金流為自己融資。匯豐還注意到,近日甲骨文的信用違約互換(CDS)出現“急劇上升”,幾周前摩根士丹利的麗莎·沙萊特 (Lisa Shalett)在接受《財富》雜志采訪時就對此發出了警告。
與許多其他撰文論述AI革命的銀行一樣,匯豐再次引用了諾貝爾獎得主羅伯特·索洛 (Robert Solow) 的名言:“除了生產率統計數據,你在任何地方都能看到計算機時代”,并冷靜地指出:“由疲軟的全要素(勞動力和資本)生產率驅動的低生產率增長,是當今發達經濟體的一個不幸特征。”事實上,該行指出,一些人甚至對已有30年歷史的互聯網革命本身是否帶來了有意義的回報表示懷疑,并引用了美聯儲主席約翰·威廉姆斯 (John Williams) 2017年的評論:“互聯網等現代技術帶來的生產率提升,迄今為止只影響了我們的休閑消費——尚未滲透到辦公室或工廠。”
美國銀行美國股票與量化策略主管薩維塔·蘇布拉曼尼亞 (Savita Subramanian) 在八月告訴《財富》雜志,她認為2020年代的經濟正在出現生產率的“巨變”,但這在本質上并非由AI驅動。她表示,在包括疫情后工資通脹在內的多種因素共同作用下,企業被迫“用更少的人做更多的事”,以可擴展且有意義的方式用流程取代人力。然而,令她猶豫的一個考慮因素是,從輕資產模式向更側重重資產模式的轉變,因為許多最具創新力的科技公司發現,他們對一種伴隨巨大風險的硬件——數據中心——有著近乎無法滿足的渴求。
幾個月后,哈佛大學經濟學家杰森·福爾曼 (Jason Furman) 做了一項粗略估算,發現若沒有數據中心,2025年上半年的GDP增長率將僅為0.1%。OpenAI似乎向市場提出了一個問題:建立在AI未來回報和生產力革命——這些遠非板上釘釘之事——之上的增長,究竟能持續多久?(財富中文網)
譯者:中慧言-王芳
Although still private, the shadow of OpenAI and its still unprofitable business despite the blockbuster success of ChatGPT have rattled markets throughout the back half of 2025. Talk of a bubble in artificial intelligence has not been quelled despite Nvidia delivering yet another blockbuster quarter in November. The question remains of how OpenAI will balance ChatGPT's seemingly endless desire, on the one hand, for “compute,” provided by data centers sprouting throughout the economy, with a business model that takes it from the red into the black. This is the same question that OpenAI CEO Sam Altman answered in a single exasperated word on a recent podcast appearance: “Enough.”
The investment bank HSBC, while clarifying that it still believes AI is a “megacycle” and that its forecasts “indicate a leading position for OpenAI from a revenue standpoint,” nevertheless calculates that the company faces an extraordinary financial mountain if it is to deliver on its ambitions. HSBC Global Investment Research projects that OpenAI still won't be profitable by 2030, even though its consumer base will grow by that point to comprise some 44% of the world's adult population (up from 10% in 2025). Beyond that, it will need at least another $207 billion of compute to keep up with its growth plans. This stark assessment reflects soaring infrastructure costs, heightened competition, and an AI market that is surging in demand and cash-intensive to a degree beyond any technology trend in history.
HSBC's semiconductor analyst team, led by Nicolas Cote-Colisson, produced the figure by updating its OpenAI forecasts for the first time since mid-October, factoring in recent multiyear commitments to cloud computing, including a $250 billion agreement with Microsoft and a $38 billion deal with Amazon. More important, HSBC notes, these deals came without any new capital injection, and they are the latest in a series of capacity expansions that now see OpenAI aiming for 36 gigawatts of AI compute power by decade's end. Assuming that one gigawatt can power roughly 750,000 homes, electricity on this scale would represent the needs of a state somewhat smaller than Texas and a little larger than Florida. The Financial Times' Alphaville blog, which previously reported on HSBC's forecast, described OpenAI as “a money pit with a website on top.”
HSBC projects that OpenAI's cumulative free cash flow by 2030 will still be negative, leaving a $207 billion funding shortfall that must be filled through additional debt, equity, or more aggressive revenue generation. HSBC analysts model OpenAI's cloud and AI infrastructure costs at $792 billion between late 2025 and 2030, with total compute commitments reaching $1.4 trillion by 2033 (HSBC notes that Altman has laid out a plan for $1.4 trillion in compute over the next eight years). It will have a $620 billion data-center rental bill alone.
Despite this, projected revenues---though growing rapidly, to over $213 billion in 2030---would simply not be enough to bridge the divide. (The bank's revenue projections are based on an assumption of a higher proportion of paid subscribers in the medium term and an assumption that large language model, or LLM, providers will capture some of the digital advertising market.)
The bank notes several options to close the gap, including dramatically ramping up the proportion of paid subscribers (going from 10% to 20% could add $194 billion in revenue); capturing a larger share of digital ad spending; or extracting extraordinary efficiencies from compute operations. But even under bullish conversion and monetization scenarios, the company would still need fresh capital beyond 2030.
OpenAI's survival is closely tied to its financial backers and the AI ecosystem. Microsoft and Amazon are not only cloud providers but also major investors, and cloud players such as Oracle, Nvidia, and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) all stand to gain---or lose---depending on OpenAI's fortunes. The risks, however, are considerable: unproven revenue models; potential market saturation for AI subscriptions; the threat of regulatory scrutiny; and the sheer scale of necessary capital injections.
HSBC suggests that OpenAI could raise more debt to fund its compute requirements, but this would be “possibly the most challenging avenue in the current market conditions,” as Oracle and Meta have recently raised a “significant amount” of debt to finance AI-related capital expenditure, “raising market concerns about the general financing of AI.” The bank notes this is an exception as most of the so-called hyperscalers have funded themselves with free cash flow, as noted by JPMorgan's Michael Cembalest recently. HSBC also noted a “sharp increase” in Oracle's credit default swaps in recent days, which Morgan Stanley's Lisa Shalett voiced alarm over several weeks earlier, in a previous interview with Fortune.
HSBC, like many other banks writing on the AI revolution, returned again to the famous quote by Nobel Prize winner Robert Solow that “you can see the computer age everywhere but in productivity statistics,” noting drily that “poor productivity gains driven by weak total factor (labor and capital) productivity are an unfortunate characteristic of today's developed economies.” In fact, the bank notes that some aren't convinced of a meaningful return yet from the 30-year-old internet revolution itself, citing Federal Reserve president John Williams's 2017 comment that “productivity provided by modern technologies like the internet has so far only influenced our consumption of leisure---and hasn't yet trickled down to offices or factories.”
Bank of America's head of U.S. equity and quantitative strategy, Savita Subramanian told?Fortune?in August that she sees a “sea change” for productivity emerging out of the economy of the 2020s in ways that aren't fundamentally about AI. Through a combination of factors, including post-pandemic wage inflation, she said that companies have been prompted “to do more with fewer people,” replacing people with process in a scalable and meaningful way. A consideration that was giving her pause, though, was a shift from an asset-light to an asset-heavier focus, as many of the most innovative tech companies have discovered a near-unquenchable thirst for a kind of hardware that carries a lot of risk with it: data centers.
A few months later, Harvard economist Jason Furman did a back-of-the-envelope calculation and found that without data centers, GDP growth would have been just 0.1% for the first half of 2025. OpenAI seems to be asking markets a question: Just how long can growth be built on the question of future returns---and a productivity revolution---from AI that are by no means ever guaranteed to arrive?