
馬睿考察中國人工智能樞紐后在社交媒體X上寫道:“我們所到之處,人們都認(rèn)為能源供應(yīng)是理所當(dāng)然的。”
對美國人工智能研究者而言,這近乎天方夜譚。高盛(Goldman Sachs)警告稱,在美國,AI需求激增正與脆弱的電網(wǎng)激烈碰撞,這種極端瓶頸可能嚴(yán)重阻礙行業(yè)的發(fā)展。
馬睿指出,在中國,電力供應(yīng)被認(rèn)為是個(gè)“早已解決的問題”。
中國科技領(lǐng)域知名專家、媒體公司Tech Buzz China創(chuàng)始人馬睿率團(tuán)隊(duì)實(shí)地考察中國AI產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展。她向《財(cái)富》雜志表示,雖然她并非能源專家,但她通過密集參加會議和業(yè)內(nèi)人士訪談得出的結(jié)論會令硅谷脊背發(fā)涼:在中國,為數(shù)據(jù)中心保障充足電力早已無需爭論。
她在X上寫道:“這與美國形成鮮明對比。美國AI產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展日益受到數(shù)據(jù)中心能耗爭議與電網(wǎng)限制的制約。”
事態(tài)嚴(yán)重性難以估量。數(shù)據(jù)中心建設(shè)是AI產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展的基石,新數(shù)據(jù)中心投資對美國GDP的影響現(xiàn)在已超越消費(fèi)者支出,這種情況令人擔(dān)憂,因?yàn)楹笳咄ǔU冀?jīng)濟(jì)總量的三分之二。麥肯錫(McKinsey)預(yù)測2025年至2030年間,全球企業(yè)需投入6.7萬億美元擴(kuò)建數(shù)據(jù)中心容量,以滿足AI需求。
Stifel Nicolaus投行近期的研報(bào)預(yù)警標(biāo)普500指數(shù)面臨回調(diào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),因?yàn)樵撏缎蓄A(yù)測數(shù)據(jù)中心基建熱潮屬一次性投資,而消費(fèi)支出正持續(xù)萎縮。
德勤(Deloitte)行業(yè)調(diào)查顯示,美國數(shù)據(jù)中心基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施發(fā)展的核心制約因素在于電網(wǎng)承受的壓力。城市電網(wǎng)極其脆弱,迫使一些企業(yè)自建電廠,而不是依靠現(xiàn)有電網(wǎng)。民眾因電費(fèi)飆升而日益不滿。在俄亥俄州,今年夏天普通家庭的電費(fèi)支出因數(shù)據(jù)中心至少上漲15美元,而能源公司則被迫應(yīng)對需求激增帶來的劇變。
高盛直指危機(jī)本質(zhì):“AI產(chǎn)業(yè)無節(jié)制的電力需求增長速度,正超越電網(wǎng)的十年發(fā)展周期,形成致命瓶頸。”
深耕中國能源領(lǐng)域多年的電力專家余德偉對《財(cái)富》雜志表示,電力在中國根本不成問題。中國年均新增用電需求超過德國全年的用電總量。農(nóng)村地區(qū)到處都有屋頂太陽能,一個(gè)省的發(fā)電量相當(dāng)于印度全國的供電量。
余德偉表示:“美國決策者應(yīng)祈禱中國保持競爭者而非進(jìn)攻者姿態(tài),因?yàn)槟壳懊绹谀茉椿I(lǐng)域毫無競爭力。”
中國電力供應(yīng)過剩
余德偉解釋稱,中國在電力領(lǐng)域悄然樹立的霸主地位,源于數(shù)十年來在發(fā)電、輸電、新一代核電等各環(huán)節(jié)的大量建設(shè)和投資。
他表示,中國的備用裕度始終維持在80%-100%,這意味著中國常年保有雙倍必需產(chǎn)能。他補(bǔ)充道,中國有充裕的冗余空間,使AI數(shù)據(jù)中心被視作“消納過剩產(chǎn)能”的便捷途徑,而非對電網(wǎng)穩(wěn)定的威脅。
這種緩沖水平在美國不可想象。美國區(qū)域電網(wǎng)的備用裕度通常只有15%甚至更低,而在遭遇極端天氣時(shí)情況更糟。在加州或得州等地,官員經(jīng)常在預(yù)測需求將導(dǎo)致電力系統(tǒng)緊張時(shí)發(fā)布警報(bào)。余德偉強(qiáng)調(diào),這種狀況導(dǎo)致電網(wǎng)沒有空間消化AI基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施所需的負(fù)荷激增。
兩國之間的備戰(zhàn)差距觸目驚心:當(dāng)美國深陷電網(wǎng)能否跟上產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展步伐的政經(jīng)博弈時(shí),中國已在充裕供電基礎(chǔ)上全速推進(jìn)。
余德偉表示,即便中國AI需求增速超越可再生能源建設(shè)節(jié)奏,閑置的煤電廠也可填補(bǔ)空缺,同時(shí)建設(shè)更多可持續(xù)能源。他承認(rèn):“雖然這并非最優(yōu)解決方案,但切實(shí)可行。”
他表示,反觀美國,新建發(fā)電容量審批動輒延誤數(shù)年,還要面對地方抵制和市場規(guī)則碎片化。
治理架構(gòu)差異
硬件優(yōu)勢背后是治理模式差異。余德偉指出,中國的能源規(guī)劃由技術(shù)官僚主導(dǎo)的長期政策協(xié)調(diào),在開始投資之前先確立市場規(guī)則。這種模式確保了基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)是提前預(yù)判需求的主動行為,而不是需求出現(xiàn)后的被動應(yīng)對。
余德偉表示:“中國的模式以‘全壘打’為目標(biāo),更具有前瞻性。而美國最多只能勉強(qiáng)上壘。”
美國大型基建嚴(yán)重依賴私人資本,但多數(shù)投資者要求三至五年回報(bào)周期,這對需十年才能建成并開始帶來回報(bào)的電力項(xiàng)目而言過短。
他表示:“資本嚴(yán)重偏向短期收益。”他指出硅谷將數(shù)十億資金投入“第N代軟件服務(wù)”,而能源項(xiàng)目卻要苦苦尋找資金。
中國則由國家預(yù)先投資戰(zhàn)略領(lǐng)域,接受部分項(xiàng)目失敗,但確保必要時(shí)產(chǎn)能就位。余德偉斷言,若無公共資金化解長期投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn),美國政經(jīng)體系根本無力構(gòu)建未來電網(wǎng)。
文化認(rèn)知強(qiáng)化了這種差異。在中國,可再生能源因經(jīng)濟(jì)和戰(zhàn)略價(jià)值被定位為基礎(chǔ)產(chǎn)業(yè),而非道德綁架的工具;煤炭未被污名化為“邪惡象征”,只是被視為落后產(chǎn)能。余德偉認(rèn)為,這種務(wù)實(shí)思維讓決策者聚焦于效率和結(jié)果,而不是陷入政治斗爭。
余德偉的結(jié)論很直白。除非美國徹底變革建設(shè)和投資能源基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的模式,否則中國的領(lǐng)先優(yōu)勢將持續(xù)擴(kuò)大。
他表示:“能力差距不僅將日益凸顯,更會在未來數(shù)年持續(xù)擴(kuò)大。”(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:劉進(jìn)龍
審校:汪皓
馬睿考察中國人工智能樞紐后在社交媒體X上寫道:“我們所到之處,人們都認(rèn)為能源供應(yīng)是理所當(dāng)然的。”
對美國人工智能研究者而言,這近乎天方夜譚。高盛(Goldman Sachs)警告稱,在美國,AI需求激增正與脆弱的電網(wǎng)激烈碰撞,這種極端瓶頸可能嚴(yán)重阻礙行業(yè)的發(fā)展。
馬睿指出,在中國,電力供應(yīng)被認(rèn)為是個(gè)“早已解決的問題”。
中國科技領(lǐng)域知名專家、媒體公司Tech Buzz China創(chuàng)始人馬睿率團(tuán)隊(duì)實(shí)地考察中國AI產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展。她向《財(cái)富》雜志表示,雖然她并非能源專家,但她通過密集參加會議和業(yè)內(nèi)人士訪談得出的結(jié)論會令硅谷脊背發(fā)涼:在中國,為數(shù)據(jù)中心保障充足電力早已無需爭論。
她在X上寫道:“這與美國形成鮮明對比。美國AI產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展日益受到數(shù)據(jù)中心能耗爭議與電網(wǎng)限制的制約。”
事態(tài)嚴(yán)重性難以估量。數(shù)據(jù)中心建設(shè)是AI產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展的基石,新數(shù)據(jù)中心投資對美國GDP的影響現(xiàn)在已超越消費(fèi)者支出,這種情況令人擔(dān)憂,因?yàn)楹笳咄ǔU冀?jīng)濟(jì)總量的三分之二。麥肯錫(McKinsey)預(yù)測2025年至2030年間,全球企業(yè)需投入6.7萬億美元擴(kuò)建數(shù)據(jù)中心容量,以滿足AI需求。
Stifel Nicolaus投行近期的研報(bào)預(yù)警標(biāo)普500指數(shù)面臨回調(diào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),因?yàn)樵撏缎蓄A(yù)測數(shù)據(jù)中心基建熱潮屬一次性投資,而消費(fèi)支出正持續(xù)萎縮。
德勤(Deloitte)行業(yè)調(diào)查顯示,美國數(shù)據(jù)中心基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施發(fā)展的核心制約因素在于電網(wǎng)承受的壓力。城市電網(wǎng)極其脆弱,迫使一些企業(yè)自建電廠,而不是依靠現(xiàn)有電網(wǎng)。民眾因電費(fèi)飆升而日益不滿。在俄亥俄州,今年夏天普通家庭的電費(fèi)支出因數(shù)據(jù)中心至少上漲15美元,而能源公司則被迫應(yīng)對需求激增帶來的劇變。
高盛直指危機(jī)本質(zhì):“AI產(chǎn)業(yè)無節(jié)制的電力需求增長速度,正超越電網(wǎng)的十年發(fā)展周期,形成致命瓶頸。”
深耕中國能源領(lǐng)域多年的電力專家余德偉對《財(cái)富》雜志表示,電力在中國根本不成問題。中國年均新增用電需求超過德國全年的用電總量。農(nóng)村地區(qū)到處都有屋頂太陽能,一個(gè)省的發(fā)電量相當(dāng)于印度全國的供電量。
余德偉表示:“美國決策者應(yīng)祈禱中國保持競爭者而非進(jìn)攻者姿態(tài),因?yàn)槟壳懊绹谀茉椿I(lǐng)域毫無競爭力。”
中國電力供應(yīng)過剩
余德偉解釋稱,中國在電力領(lǐng)域悄然樹立的霸主地位,源于數(shù)十年來在發(fā)電、輸電、新一代核電等各環(huán)節(jié)的大量建設(shè)和投資。
他表示,中國的備用裕度始終維持在80%-100%,這意味著中國常年保有雙倍必需產(chǎn)能。他補(bǔ)充道,中國有充裕的冗余空間,使AI數(shù)據(jù)中心被視作“消納過剩產(chǎn)能”的便捷途徑,而非對電網(wǎng)穩(wěn)定的威脅。
這種緩沖水平在美國不可想象。美國區(qū)域電網(wǎng)的備用裕度通常只有15%甚至更低,而在遭遇極端天氣時(shí)情況更糟。在加州或得州等地,官員經(jīng)常在預(yù)測需求將導(dǎo)致電力系統(tǒng)緊張時(shí)發(fā)布警報(bào)。余德偉強(qiáng)調(diào),這種狀況導(dǎo)致電網(wǎng)沒有空間消化AI基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施所需的負(fù)荷激增。
兩國之間的備戰(zhàn)差距觸目驚心:當(dāng)美國深陷電網(wǎng)能否跟上產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展步伐的政經(jīng)博弈時(shí),中國已在充裕供電基礎(chǔ)上全速推進(jìn)。
余德偉表示,即便中國AI需求增速超越可再生能源建設(shè)節(jié)奏,閑置的煤電廠也可填補(bǔ)空缺,同時(shí)建設(shè)更多可持續(xù)能源。他承認(rèn):“雖然這并非最優(yōu)解決方案,但切實(shí)可行。”
他表示,反觀美國,新建發(fā)電容量審批動輒延誤數(shù)年,還要面對地方抵制和市場規(guī)則碎片化。
治理架構(gòu)差異
硬件優(yōu)勢背后是治理模式差異。余德偉指出,中國的能源規(guī)劃由技術(shù)官僚主導(dǎo)的長期政策協(xié)調(diào),在開始投資之前先確立市場規(guī)則。這種模式確保了基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)是提前預(yù)判需求的主動行為,而不是需求出現(xiàn)后的被動應(yīng)對。
余德偉表示:“中國的模式以‘全壘打’為目標(biāo),更具有前瞻性。而美國最多只能勉強(qiáng)上壘。”
美國大型基建嚴(yán)重依賴私人資本,但多數(shù)投資者要求三至五年回報(bào)周期,這對需十年才能建成并開始帶來回報(bào)的電力項(xiàng)目而言過短。
他表示:“資本嚴(yán)重偏向短期收益。”他指出硅谷將數(shù)十億資金投入“第N代軟件服務(wù)”,而能源項(xiàng)目卻要苦苦尋找資金。
中國則由國家預(yù)先投資戰(zhàn)略領(lǐng)域,接受部分項(xiàng)目失敗,但確保必要時(shí)產(chǎn)能就位。余德偉斷言,若無公共資金化解長期投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn),美國政經(jīng)體系根本無力構(gòu)建未來電網(wǎng)。
文化認(rèn)知強(qiáng)化了這種差異。在中國,可再生能源因經(jīng)濟(jì)和戰(zhàn)略價(jià)值被定位為基礎(chǔ)產(chǎn)業(yè),而非道德綁架的工具;煤炭未被污名化為“邪惡象征”,只是被視為落后產(chǎn)能。余德偉認(rèn)為,這種務(wù)實(shí)思維讓決策者聚焦于效率和結(jié)果,而不是陷入政治斗爭。
余德偉的結(jié)論很直白。除非美國徹底變革建設(shè)和投資能源基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的模式,否則中國的領(lǐng)先優(yōu)勢將持續(xù)擴(kuò)大。
他表示:“能力差距不僅將日益凸顯,更會在未來數(shù)年持續(xù)擴(kuò)大。”(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:劉進(jìn)龍
審校:汪皓
“Everywhere we went, people treated energy availability as a given,” Rui Ma wrote on X after returning from a recent tour of China’s AI hubs.
For American AI researchers, that’s almost unimaginable. In the U.S., surging AI demand is colliding with a fragile power grid, the kind of extreme bottleneck that Goldman Sachs warns could severely choke the industry’s growth.
In China, Ma continued, it’s considered a “solved problem.”
Ma, a renowned expert in Chinese technology and founder of the media company Tech Buzz China, took her team on the road to get a firsthand look at the country’s AI advancements. She told Fortune that while she isn’t an energy expert, she attended enough meetings and talked to enough insiders to come away with a conclusion that should send chills down the spine of Silicon Valley: in China, building enough power for data centers is no longer up for debate.
“This is a stark contrast to the U.S., where AI growth is increasingly tied to debates over data center power consumption and grid limitations,” she wrote on X.
The stakes are difficult to overstate. Data center building is the foundation of AI advancement, and spending on new centers now displaces consumer spending in terms of impact to U.S. GDP—that’s concerning since consumer spending is generally two-thirds of the pie. McKinsey projects that between 2025 and 2030, companies worldwide will need to invest $6.7 trillion into new data center capacity to keep up with AI’s strain.
In a recent research note, Stifel Nicolaus warned of a looming correction to the S&P 500, since it forecasts this data-center capex boom to be a one-off build-out of infrastructure, while consumer spending is clearly on the wane.
However, the clear limiting factor to the U.S.’s data center infrastructure development, according to a Deloitte industry survey, is stress on the power grid. Cities’ power grids are so weak that some companies are just building their own power plants rather than relying on existing grids. The public is growing increasingly frustrated over increasing energy bills – in Ohio, the electricity bill for a typical household has increased at least $15 this summer from the data centers – while energy companies prepare for a sea-change of surging demand.
Goldman Sachs frames the crisis simply: “AI’s insatiable power demand is outpacing the grid’s decade-long development cycles, creating a critical bottleneck.”
Meanwhile, David Fishman, a Chinese electricity expert who has spent years tracking their energy development, told Fortune that in China, electricity isn’t even a question. On average, China adds more electricity demand than the entire annual consumption of Germany, every single year. Whole rural provinces are blanketed in rooftop solar, with one province matching the entirety of India’s electricity supply.
“U.S. policymakers should be hoping China stays a competitor and not an aggressor,” Fishman said. “Because right now they can’t compete effectively on the energy infrastructure front.”
China has an oversupply of electricty
China’s quiet electricity dominance, Fishman explained, is the result of decades of deliberate overbuilding and investment in every layer of the power sector, from generation to transmission to next-generation nuclear.
The country’s reserve margin has never dipped below 80%–100% nationwide, meaning it has consistently maintained at least twice the capacity it needs, Fishman said. They have so much available space that instead of seeing AI data centers as a threat to grid stability, China treats them as a convenient way to “soak up oversupply,” he added.
That level of cushion is unthinkable in the United States, where regional grids typically operate with a 15% reserve margin and sometimes less, particularly during extreme weather, Fishman said. In places like California or Texas, officials often issue warnings about red-flag conditions when demand is projected to strain the system. This leaves little room to absorb the rapid load increases AI infrastructure requires, Fishman ntoed.
The gap in readiness is stark: while the U.S. is already experiencing political and economic fights over whether the grid can keep up, China is operating from a position of abundance.
Even if AI demand in China grows so quickly renewable projects can’t keep pace, Fishman said, the country can tap idle coal plants to bridge the gap while building more sustainable sources. “It’s not preferable,” he admitted, “but it’s doable.”
By contrast, the U.S. would have to scramble to bring on new generation capacity, often facing years-long permitting delays, local opposition, and fragmented market rules, he said.
Structural governance differences
Underpinning the hardware advantage is a difference in governance. In China, energy planning is coordinated by long-term, technocratic policy that defines the market’s rules before investments are made, Fishman said. This model ensures infrastructure buildout happens in anticipation of demand, not in reaction to it.
“They’re set up to hit grand slams,” Fishman noted. “The U.S., at best, can get on base.”
In the U.S., large-scale infrastructure projects depend heavily on private investment, but most investors expect a return within three to five years: far too short for power projects that can take a decade to build and pay off.
“Capital is really biased toward shorter-term returns,” he said, noting Silicon Valley has funneled billions into “the nth iteration of software-as-a-service” while energy projects fight for funding.
In China, by contrast, the state directs money toward strategic sectors in advance of demand, accepting not every project will succeed but ensuring the capacity is in place when it’s needed. Without public financing to de-risk long-term bets, he argued, the U.S. political and economic system is simply not set up to build the grid of the future.
Cultural attitudes reinforce this approach. In China, renewables are framed as a cornerstone of the economy because they make sense economically and strategically, not because they carry moral weight. Coal use isn’t cast as a sign of villainy, as it would be among some circles in the U.S. – it’s simply seen as outdated. This pragmatic framing, Fishman argued, allows policymakers to focus on efficiency and results rather than political battles.
For Fishman, the takeaway is blunt. Without a dramatic shift in how the U.S. builds and funds its energy infrastructure, China’s lead will only widen.
“The gap in capability is only going to continue to become more obvious — and grow in the coming years,” he said.