
2011年以來最疲軟的美國就業市場,正逐漸被界定為一種新常態,而非短期波動——經濟增長勢頭強勁,而就業數據卻近乎停滯,使得一代人追問:“工作機會究竟在何處?”
美國銀行全球研究部在2025年12月中旬發布的《形勢觀察室》報告中發出警示,盡管招聘陷入停滯、失業率持續攀升,市場定價仍反映出投資者對2026年經濟強勁復蘇的預期。為闡明觀點,報告援引25年前由阿什頓·庫徹(Ashton Kutcher)與西恩·威廉·斯科特(Seann William Scott)主演的經典喜劇電影《豬頭,我的車咧?》。
換言之,職場新人在求職時的迷茫無措,與庫徹和斯科特發現愛車被盜后的慌亂心境如出一轍,這種焦慮情緒在當代就業市場中具有現實合理性。(事實上,《豬頭,我的車咧?》的編劇對演藝行業勞動力市場的看法,也與這一觀點高度契合,他數周前在接受《好萊塢報道者》采訪時透露,自己已轉行成為心理咨詢師。)
“今年美國就業市場持續疲軟,”美銀分析師尤里·塞利格(Yuri Seliger)與李素賢(Sohyun Marie Lee)在評論去年10月和11月雙月非農就業資報告時寫道,“就業市場復蘇乏力與美國經濟增速放緩,將成為2026年需關注的核心風險?!?
塞利格和李素賢指出,當前美國就業市場疲軟程度已創下2011年以來的最差紀錄(新冠疫情引發大規模裁員潮時期除外),過去六個月月均新增就業崗位僅1.7萬個,這一增速創下全球金融危機以來的最低紀錄。私營部門就業表現雖略勝一籌,六個月月均新增4.4萬個崗位,但同樣處于十多年來的最低水平;更廣泛的U6失業率攀升至8.7%,每名失業者對應的職位空缺數降至1.0,兩項指標均觸及2017年以來的最低水平。

然而,美銀《形勢觀察室》團隊也指出,當前信用利差仍處于周期高位,股市更是逼近歷史峰值,這反映出投資者對2026年經濟強勁復蘇的預期?!懊绹洕舫掷m保持強勁增長,與就業增長停滯的狀態恐難共存。”分析師們警示稱,并指出就業市場復蘇乏力,已成為當前樂觀預期的核心風險之一。在美銀報告發布后,美國公布了遠超市場預期的第三季度國內生產總值數據,為上述觀點提供新佐證。
K型增長伴隨就業缺口
美國經濟增長數據亮眼:受消費支出激增與企業利潤增加1660億美元的雙重驅動,第三季度國內生產總值(GDP)的年化增長率達到4.3%。但居民實際可支配收入持平,或者可以說是陷入零增長,這意味著家庭購買力并未得到實質性提升,而是依靠消耗儲蓄、借貸與削減開支來維持消費,尤其在醫療保健和兒童保育等剛性支出方面。
畢馬威(KPMG)首席經濟學家戴安·斯旺克(Diane Swonk)此前在接受《財富》雜志采訪時指出,當前美國經濟已完全步入成熟的K型增長階段:富裕家庭憑借股市收益飆升、房產增值及企業盈利(在人工智能推動下)實現財富躍升;而中低收入家庭則深陷可負擔性壓力與實際收入停滯的雙重擠壓。
她指出企業已摸索出一條無需增聘人手即可實現增長的路徑——通過精簡團隊榨取更高產出,而非依靠擴大招聘來滿足需求。這一發展模式與美銀的研判不謀而合:在宏觀環境穩健的背景下,就業增長卻創下歷史新低?!爱斍吧a力提升的核心驅動力,實則是企業招聘意愿持續低迷,選擇以更少人力完成更多工作,”斯旺克向《財富》雜志坦言,“這未必是人工智能的功勞?!?
她的分析與美銀策略師薩維塔·蘇布拉曼尼亞(Savita Subramanian)8月向《財富》雜志提出的勞動者生產力“根本性轉變”論斷高度契合——企業正通過流程優化替代人力投入。她指出,后疫情時代的通脹壓力促使企業“以更少人力完成更多工作”,并預測這一趨勢將利好股市:“流程優化成本趨近于零,且能無限復制。”
高盛解讀“無就業增長”與Z世代困境
更令人憂慮的是,高盛(Goldman Sachs)經濟學家發出“無就業增長”預警,這一判斷與美聯儲主席杰羅姆·鮑威爾提出的“低招聘、低裁員”就業市場特征相呼應。高盛經濟學家戴維·梅里克爾(David Mericle)和皮爾弗朗切斯科·梅伊(Pierfrancesco Mei)在去年10月的報告中指出,盡管產出持續攀升,但除醫療保健業外,多數行業凈新增就業崗位已陷入疲軟、增長停滯甚至負增長的困境。企業高管正愈發聚焦于運用人工智能削減人力成本——這將成為“勞動力需求的潛在長期逆風”。
他們認為近期出現的就業溫和增長與國內生產總值強勁增長并存現象,“未來數年可能成為常態”,未來經濟增長的主要動力將來自生產率的提升(尤其是人工智能技術賦能),而人口老齡化與移民減少將限制勞動力供給對經濟增長的貢獻度。
阿波羅全球管理公司(Apollo Global Management)的托爾斯滕·斯洛克(Torsten Slok)在去年12月的報告中指出,人口結構變化已愈發明顯:盡管總人口持續增長,但在生育率下降與人口老齡化的雙重擠壓下,育有18歲以下子女的家庭數量已從2007年約3700萬戶的峰值回落至2024年的約3300萬戶。

脆弱的平衡
美銀與高盛均未預測大規模失業潮的到來,但兩家機構一致認為,過去那種“國內生產總值強勁增長必然帶來大量新增就業”的模式難以重現。此外,高盛還預見經濟將面臨更大震蕩:梅里克爾與梅伊在去年10月的報告中寫道,“歷史經驗表明,人工智能對勞動力市場的全面影響,可能要等到經濟陷入衰退,才會顯現。”
與此同時,21世紀20年代中期勞動力市場的特征或許不再是裁員潮,而是機會稀缺——尤其對Z世代而言——頂層群體牢牢占據優質崗位資源,底層群體卻陷入求職無門的困境。結合國內生產總值數據與“無就業增長”的前景來看,美銀那句帶著戲謔色彩的發問,在新的一年里或將愈發振聾發聵:工作機會究竟在何處?(財富中文網)
譯者:中慧言-王芳
2011年以來最疲軟的美國就業市場,正逐漸被界定為一種新常態,而非短期波動——經濟增長勢頭強勁,而就業數據卻近乎停滯,使得一代人追問:“工作機會究竟在何處?”
美國銀行全球研究部在2025年12月中旬發布的《形勢觀察室》報告中發出警示,盡管招聘陷入停滯、失業率持續攀升,市場定價仍反映出投資者對2026年經濟強勁復蘇的預期。為闡明觀點,報告援引25年前由阿什頓·庫徹(Ashton Kutcher)與西恩·威廉·斯科特(Seann William Scott)主演的經典喜劇電影《豬頭,我的車咧?》。
換言之,職場新人在求職時的迷茫無措,與庫徹和斯科特發現愛車被盜后的慌亂心境如出一轍,這種焦慮情緒在當代就業市場中具有現實合理性。(事實上,《豬頭,我的車咧?》的編劇對演藝行業勞動力市場的看法,也與這一觀點高度契合,他數周前在接受《好萊塢報道者》采訪時透露,自己已轉行成為心理咨詢師。)
“今年美國就業市場持續疲軟,”美銀分析師尤里·塞利格(Yuri Seliger)與李素賢(Sohyun Marie Lee)在評論去年10月和11月雙月非農就業資報告時寫道,“就業市場復蘇乏力與美國經濟增速放緩,將成為2026年需關注的核心風險。”
塞利格和李素賢指出,當前美國就業市場疲軟程度已創下2011年以來的最差紀錄(新冠疫情引發大規模裁員潮時期除外),過去六個月月均新增就業崗位僅1.7萬個,這一增速創下全球金融危機以來的最低紀錄。私營部門就業表現雖略勝一籌,六個月月均新增4.4萬個崗位,但同樣處于十多年來的最低水平;更廣泛的U6失業率攀升至8.7%,每名失業者對應的職位空缺數降至1.0,兩項指標均觸及2017年以來的最低水平。
然而,美銀《形勢觀察室》團隊也指出,當前信用利差仍處于周期高位,股市更是逼近歷史峰值,這反映出投資者對2026年經濟強勁復蘇的預期?!懊绹洕舫掷m保持強勁增長,與就業增長停滯的狀態恐難共存。”分析師們警示稱,并指出就業市場復蘇乏力,已成為當前樂觀預期的核心風險之一。在美銀報告發布后,美國公布了遠超市場預期的第三季度國內生產總值數據,為上述觀點提供新佐證。
K型增長伴隨就業缺口
美國經濟增長數據亮眼:受消費支出激增與企業利潤增加1660億美元的雙重驅動,第三季度國內生產總值(GDP)的年化增長率達到4.3%。但居民實際可支配收入持平,或者可以說是陷入零增長,這意味著家庭購買力并未得到實質性提升,而是依靠消耗儲蓄、借貸與削減開支來維持消費,尤其在醫療保健和兒童保育等剛性支出方面。
畢馬威(KPMG)首席經濟學家戴安·斯旺克(Diane Swonk)此前在接受《財富》雜志采訪時指出,當前美國經濟已完全步入成熟的K型增長階段:富裕家庭憑借股市收益飆升、房產增值及企業盈利(在人工智能推動下)實現財富躍升;而中低收入家庭則深陷可負擔性壓力與實際收入停滯的雙重擠壓。
她指出企業已摸索出一條無需增聘人手即可實現增長的路徑——通過精簡團隊榨取更高產出,而非依靠擴大招聘來滿足需求。這一發展模式與美銀的研判不謀而合:在宏觀環境穩健的背景下,就業增長卻創下歷史新低?!爱斍吧a力提升的核心驅動力,實則是企業招聘意愿持續低迷,選擇以更少人力完成更多工作,”斯旺克向《財富》雜志坦言,“這未必是人工智能的功勞?!?
她的分析與美銀策略師薩維塔·蘇布拉曼尼亞(Savita Subramanian)8月向《財富》雜志提出的勞動者生產力“根本性轉變”論斷高度契合——企業正通過流程優化替代人力投入。她指出,后疫情時代的通脹壓力促使企業“以更少人力完成更多工作”,并預測這一趨勢將利好股市:“流程優化成本趨近于零,且能無限復制。”
高盛解讀“無就業增長”與Z世代困境
更令人憂慮的是,高盛(Goldman Sachs)經濟學家發出“無就業增長”預警,這一判斷與美聯儲主席杰羅姆·鮑威爾提出的“低招聘、低裁員”就業市場特征相呼應。高盛經濟學家戴維·梅里克爾(David Mericle)和皮爾弗朗切斯科·梅伊(Pierfrancesco Mei)在去年10月的報告中指出,盡管產出持續攀升,但除醫療保健業外,多數行業凈新增就業崗位已陷入疲軟、增長停滯甚至負增長的困境。企業高管正愈發聚焦于運用人工智能削減人力成本——這將成為“勞動力需求的潛在長期逆風”。
他們認為近期出現的就業溫和增長與國內生產總值強勁增長并存現象,“未來數年可能成為常態”,未來經濟增長的主要動力將來自生產率的提升(尤其是人工智能技術賦能),而人口老齡化與移民減少將限制勞動力供給對經濟增長的貢獻度。
阿波羅全球管理公司(Apollo Global Management)的托爾斯滕·斯洛克(Torsten Slok)在去年12月的報告中指出,人口結構變化已愈發明顯:盡管總人口持續增長,但在生育率下降與人口老齡化的雙重擠壓下,育有18歲以下子女的家庭數量已從2007年約3700萬戶的峰值回落至2024年的約3300萬戶。
脆弱的平衡
美銀與高盛均未預測大規模失業潮的到來,但兩家機構一致認為,過去那種“國內生產總值強勁增長必然帶來大量新增就業”的模式難以重現。此外,高盛還預見經濟將面臨更大震蕩:梅里克爾與梅伊在去年10月的報告中寫道,“歷史經驗表明,人工智能對勞動力市場的全面影響,可能要等到經濟陷入衰退,才會顯現?!?
與此同時,21世紀20年代中期勞動力市場的特征或許不再是裁員潮,而是機會稀缺——尤其對Z世代而言——頂層群體牢牢占據優質崗位資源,底層群體卻陷入求職無門的困境。結合國內生產總值數據與“無就業增長”的前景來看,美銀那句帶著戲謔色彩的發問,在新的一年里或將愈發振聾發聵:工作機會究竟在何處?(財富中文網)
譯者:中慧言-王芳
The weakest job market since 2011 is increasingly being framed not as a glitch, but as the new normal—one where growth roars and jobs barely move, leaving a generation asking, “Dude, where’s my job?”
Bank of America Global Research’s “Situation Room” note warned in mid-December that markets are priced for a robust 2026 even as hiring stalls and unemployment rises and recalled a now 25-year-old cult classic stoner comedy starring Ashton Kutcher and Seann William Scott to make its point.
The entry-level worker would be forgiven, in other words, for feeling about their job search the way Kutcher and Scott felt about their stolen wheels. (In fact, the screenwriter of Dude, Where’s My Car? had a similar take on the show-business labor market, telling The Hollywood Reporter several weeks ago that he’d quit to become a therapist.)
“The job market has been weak this year,” wrote BofA’s Yuri Seliger and Sohyun Marie Lee, commenting on the double payroll report showing weak job growth in October and November. “A lack of recovery in the jobs market and a slower U.S. economy are key risks to watch for in 2026.”
Seliger and Lee flagged what they called the weakest U.S. job market since at least 2011 (with the notable exception of the mass layoff wave from COVID), with growth in monthly payrolls averaging just 17,000 over the past six months—by far the slowest pace of job creation since the Global Financial Crisis. Private payrolls are only modestly stronger at 44,000 on a six month average basis, still at their weakest level in well over a decade, while broader U 6 underemployment has climbed to 8.7% and job openings per unemployed worker have slumped to 1.0, both the softest since 2017.
Yet the Situation Room team also noted that credit spreads remain near cyclical heights and stocks near record highs, signaling that investors are still betting on a strong expansion in 2026. “A strong U.S. economy is likely not compatible with the absence of job growth,” they caution, warning that the lack of a labor market recovery is now one of the central risks to that bullish market narrative. The surprisingly strong GDP number for the third quarter, revealed after the BofA note was written, added new fuel to the fires of this argument.
K shaped growth with missing jobs
The headline growth number was eye catching: in the third quarter, U.S. GDP grew at a 4.3% annual rate, powered by a consumer spending surge and a $166 billion jump in corporate profits. But real disposable income was flat—literally 0% growth—meaning households did not gain purchasing power and instead relied on savings, credit, and cost cutting to keep spending, especially on unavoidable items like health care and childcare.
KPMG chief economist Diane Swonk previously described this to Fortune as a fully mature K shaped economy, where affluent households ride surging equity markets, elevated home values, and AI boosted corporate earnings, while lower and middle income families are squeezed by affordability pressures and stagnant real income.
Businesses, she argued, have learned how to grow without hiring, squeezing more output from lean teams rather than expanding payrolls to meet demand—a pattern that aligns with BofA’s evidence of historically weak payroll gains in an otherwise solid macro backdrop. “We are seeing most of the productivity gains we’re seeing right now as really just the residual of companies being hesitant to hire and doing more with less,” Swonk told Fortune. “Not necessarily AI yet.”
Her analysis aligned with what BofA’s Savita Subramanian told Fortune in August about a “sea change” in worker productivity, as companies replaced people with process. Companies had learned how to “do more with fewer people” after the inflation that followed the pandemic, and she predicted this will be a positive for stocks: “A process is almost free, and it’s replicable for eternity.”
Goldman’s ‘jobless growth’ and Gen Z
More darkly, Goldman Sachs economists warned about the prospect of “jobless growth,” echoing Fed Chair Jerome Powell’s description of a “low-hire, low-fire” labor market. In an October note, Goldman economists David Mericle and Pierfrancesco Mei found that outside of health care, net job creation turned weak, zero, or negative in many sectors even as output keeps rising, with executives increasingly focused on using AI to reduce labor costs—a “potentially long lasting headwind to labor demand.”
They argued that the modest job gains alongside robust GDP seen recently are “likely to be normal to some degree in the years ahead,” with most growth coming from productivity—especially via AI—while aging demographics and lower immigration limit labor supply contributions.
Apollo Global Management’s Torsten Slok pointed out in a December note that demographic change is now becoming visible: The number of families with children under 18 peaked at around 37 million in 2007 and has declined to approximately 33 million as of 2024, reflecting lower birth rates and an aging population, despite overall population growth continuing.
A fragile equilibrium
Both BofA and Goldman stop short of predicting mass unemployment, but neither sees an easy path back to the old playbook where strong GDP reliably meant plentiful new jobs. Still, Goldman sees a larger shakeout for the economy: “History also suggests that the full consequences of AI for the labor market might not become apparent until a recession hits,” Mericle and Mei wrote in October.
In the meantime, the mid 2020s labor market may remain defined less by layoffs than by scarcity of opportunity—especially for Gen Z—an era of job hugging at the top and job hunting in vain at the bottom. Seen in light of the GDP figures and the prospect of jobless growth over the horizon, BofA’s glib, throwback question may only become more pressing in the new year: Where are the jobs?