
2月28日上午德黑蘭遭襲之際,數(shù)百萬(wàn)伊朗民眾的手機(jī)突然收到一條奇怪的推送通知。下載量超過(guò)500萬(wàn)次的祈禱應(yīng)用程序BadeSaba Calendar遭到黑客入侵。根據(jù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)情報(bào)公司Flashpoint的評(píng)估,該應(yīng)用程序發(fā)布了“援軍已到!”的提醒,并呼吁組建“人民軍隊(duì)”來(lái)保衛(wèi)“伊朗兄弟”。3月1日,該應(yīng)用程序又向伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)(Islamic Revolutionary Guard)的普通成員發(fā)送了“投降指令”,并向示威者提供了安全集結(jié)地點(diǎn)。
隨后,政權(quán)擁護(hù)者迅速展開(kāi)反擊。
Flashpoint指出,3月1日隨后發(fā)生了名為伊朗“偉大史詩(shī)”(Great Epic)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)行動(dòng),這是迄今為止“最為激進(jìn)”的一次攻擊。該行動(dòng)由名為“網(wǎng)絡(luò)伊斯蘭抵抗”(Cyber Islamic Resistance)的頻道統(tǒng)籌,屬于一個(gè)松散協(xié)作的網(wǎng)絡(luò)行動(dòng)組織。在該組織的框架下,多名網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊者曾經(jīng)關(guān)閉約旦的加油站系統(tǒng),對(duì)美國(guó)及以色列的軍事供應(yīng)商發(fā)起攻擊,破壞數(shù)據(jù),并效仿BadeSaba被黑事件發(fā)起心理戰(zhàn)。
Flashpoint在最新通報(bào)中指出,未來(lái)48小時(shí)很可能出現(xiàn)“極度動(dòng)蕩”時(shí)期,屆時(shí)黑客行動(dòng)主義者及其代理組織將“率先升級(jí)行動(dòng),填補(bǔ)德黑蘭中央指揮體系留下的權(quán)力真空”。Flashpoint威脅情報(bào)團(tuán)隊(duì)負(fù)責(zé)人、前美國(guó)國(guó)家安全局(NSA)專家凱瑟琳·雷恩斯表示,這些行動(dòng)者據(jù)稱正在利用Telegram和Reddit作為協(xié)調(diào)平臺(tái),發(fā)布所謂攻擊截圖以示“戰(zhàn)果”,但相關(guān)信息的真實(shí)性往往需要數(shù)周甚至數(shù)月時(shí)間才能核實(shí)。
BadeSaba被黑事件為伊朗代理組織提供了一種可“反向應(yīng)用”的操作范本,以類似手法對(duì)付西方企業(yè)及其他目標(biāo)。雷恩斯指出,由于2月28日的打擊行動(dòng)幾乎瓦解了伊朗的最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層,原本統(tǒng)籌德黑蘭網(wǎng)絡(luò)行動(dòng)的指揮體系基本不復(fù)存在。
她告訴《財(cái)富》雜志:“伊朗領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層的權(quán)力真空,很可能導(dǎo)致更不可預(yù)測(cè)、更加分散的代理攻擊。”
在實(shí)際操作層面,這意味著立場(chǎng)一致的黑客行動(dòng)主義者和代理組織可能自行決定攻擊目標(biāo),而無(wú)需獲得中央授權(quán)。雷恩斯稱,如果某個(gè)激進(jìn)團(tuán)體為了“表達(dá)立場(chǎng)”而決定攻擊一家中型物流企業(yè),其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就將外溢到德黑蘭、華盛頓或紐約以外的地區(qū)。
她警告道:“主動(dòng)權(quán)掌握在Telegram群組里19歲黑客的手中,幾乎沒(méi)有任何監(jiān)督或指揮。”
因此,人工智能安全公司Andesite聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人及首席執(zhí)行官、前美國(guó)中央情報(bào)局(CIA)精銳“特別行動(dòng)中心”(Special Activities Center)負(fù)責(zé)人布萊恩·卡博表示,美國(guó)企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者必須為持續(xù)的不確定性做好準(zhǔn)備。他指出,多年來(lái),伊朗無(wú)論作為政府還是作為抵抗力量,都展現(xiàn)出極強(qiáng)的韌性。鑒于伊朗正在轟炸鄰國(guó),人們應(yīng)當(dāng)預(yù)期,伊朗除了動(dòng)用導(dǎo)彈與遍布全球的武裝代理力量之外,還將繼續(xù)釋放其強(qiáng)大的網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊能力。
曾經(jīng)擔(dān)任兩任美國(guó)中央情報(bào)局局長(zhǎng)幕僚長(zhǎng)的卡博說(shuō):“激進(jìn)且富有創(chuàng)造性的抵抗,早已融入伊朗安全體系以及整個(gè)伊斯蘭共和國(guó)的精神內(nèi)核。對(duì)于企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者以及那些負(fù)責(zé)保護(hù)企業(yè)的高層決策者而言,他們必須做好長(zhǎng)期應(yīng)對(duì)這種局面的準(zhǔn)備,并意識(shí)到?jīng)_突可能朝著不同方向演變,局勢(shì)隨時(shí)可能發(fā)生轉(zhuǎn)折。”
卡博認(rèn)為,美國(guó)與以色列的打擊削弱了伊朗的常規(guī)軍事能力,這反倒讓網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊變成了伊朗手中更有吸引力的一張牌。這種手段部署成本低、難以溯源,卻能以相對(duì)有限的投入制造巨大的心理與運(yùn)營(yíng)層面的沖擊。例如,伊朗已經(jīng)證明其能夠模仿并升級(jí)由俄羅斯首創(chuàng)的一些網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊方式。
卡博表示:“伊朗伊斯蘭共和國(guó)向來(lái)對(duì)其安全體系內(nèi)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)能力引以為傲。”這種自豪感不太可能因?yàn)楦邔宇I(lǐng)導(dǎo)遇襲身亡而消失,反而可能隨著選擇減少而得到進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化。
雷恩斯則指出,大多數(shù)企業(yè)的安全預(yù)案尚未準(zhǔn)備好應(yīng)對(duì)類似BadeSaba黑客事件。該事件在打擊行動(dòng)剛開(kāi)始之際,向數(shù)百萬(wàn)名使用該應(yīng)用程序記錄每日宗教日程的伊朗穆斯林推送通知。
她解釋道:“企業(yè)其實(shí)并未準(zhǔn)備好應(yīng)對(duì)我所說(shuō)的‘虛無(wú)主義的心理戰(zhàn)’。這種攻擊的真正目標(biāo)是員工的心理狀態(tài)與信任感。”她認(rèn)為這種行動(dòng)與旨在竊取數(shù)據(jù)或癱瘓系統(tǒng)的傳統(tǒng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊有所區(qū)別。
這種攻擊在企業(yè)層面可能表現(xiàn)為:海灣地區(qū)的員工突然收到看似緊急的信息,可能是模仿其區(qū)域負(fù)責(zé)人或首席執(zhí)行官的深度偽造語(yǔ)音,或是假借公司名義發(fā)布的撤離通知。然而,在當(dāng)?shù)匦侣勍[、互聯(lián)網(wǎng)連接極其有限的情況下,人們幾乎沒(méi)有能力核實(shí)這些信息的真?zhèn)巍?/p>
雷恩斯指出,很少有企業(yè)制定預(yù)案,以應(yīng)對(duì)事件發(fā)生后數(shù)小時(shí)內(nèi)員工面臨的現(xiàn)實(shí)處境;同時(shí),風(fēng)險(xiǎn)建模往往基于國(guó)家行為與假定的“紅線”,假設(shè)各方會(huì)避免全面戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。
她預(yù)測(cè),對(duì)于本周即將召開(kāi)會(huì)議的董事會(huì)與高管層而言,安全負(fù)責(zé)人必須回答的關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題是,業(yè)務(wù)系統(tǒng)在離線狀態(tài)下最長(zhǎng)能持續(xù)多久,以免影響到企業(yè)營(yíng)收與聲譽(yù)。
她表示:“我們關(guān)注的已經(jīng)不再是攔截率,而是更關(guān)心恢復(fù)時(shí)間。”
卡博稱,如果他本周參加董事會(huì)會(huì)議,他迫切想要知道,基于當(dāng)前的伊朗局勢(shì),企業(yè)是否處于更高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之中?如果答案是肯定的,他就會(huì)進(jìn)一步追問(wèn)已經(jīng)采取哪些措施減緩風(fēng)險(xiǎn);如果答案是否定的,他將會(huì)提出更多問(wèn)題。
他指出,管理層應(yīng)當(dāng)了解企業(yè)已經(jīng)采取哪些措施來(lái)確保業(yè)務(wù)不受威脅,弄清楚企業(yè)如何與合作伙伴及其他方合作共享如何檢測(cè)攻擊,以及在此過(guò)程中如何利用人工智能技術(shù)。
卡博重申,這并非一場(chǎng)短期內(nèi)即可化解的危機(jī),其衍生的網(wǎng)絡(luò)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也不會(huì)立即消散。
卡博說(shuō):“這場(chǎng)沖突可能出現(xiàn)諸多轉(zhuǎn)折,并朝著多個(gè)方向演變。我認(rèn)為這不是可以在幾天內(nèi)就圓滿解決的問(wèn)題。這就要求我們持續(xù)保持警惕,加強(qiáng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)防御、保護(hù)實(shí)體以及其他各類資產(chǎn)的安全。”(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:劉進(jìn)龍
2月28日上午德黑蘭遭襲之際,數(shù)百萬(wàn)伊朗民眾的手機(jī)突然收到一條奇怪的推送通知。下載量超過(guò)500萬(wàn)次的祈禱應(yīng)用程序BadeSaba Calendar遭到黑客入侵。根據(jù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)情報(bào)公司Flashpoint的評(píng)估,該應(yīng)用程序發(fā)布了“援軍已到!”的提醒,并呼吁組建“人民軍隊(duì)”來(lái)保衛(wèi)“伊朗兄弟”。3月1日,該應(yīng)用程序又向伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)(Islamic Revolutionary Guard)的普通成員發(fā)送了“投降指令”,并向示威者提供了安全集結(jié)地點(diǎn)。
隨后,政權(quán)擁護(hù)者迅速展開(kāi)反擊。
Flashpoint指出,3月1日隨后發(fā)生了名為伊朗“偉大史詩(shī)”(Great Epic)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)行動(dòng),這是迄今為止“最為激進(jìn)”的一次攻擊。該行動(dòng)由名為“網(wǎng)絡(luò)伊斯蘭抵抗”(Cyber Islamic Resistance)的頻道統(tǒng)籌,屬于一個(gè)松散協(xié)作的網(wǎng)絡(luò)行動(dòng)組織。在該組織的框架下,多名網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊者曾經(jīng)關(guān)閉約旦的加油站系統(tǒng),對(duì)美國(guó)及以色列的軍事供應(yīng)商發(fā)起攻擊,破壞數(shù)據(jù),并效仿BadeSaba被黑事件發(fā)起心理戰(zhàn)。
Flashpoint在最新通報(bào)中指出,未來(lái)48小時(shí)很可能出現(xiàn)“極度動(dòng)蕩”時(shí)期,屆時(shí)黑客行動(dòng)主義者及其代理組織將“率先升級(jí)行動(dòng),填補(bǔ)德黑蘭中央指揮體系留下的權(quán)力真空”。Flashpoint威脅情報(bào)團(tuán)隊(duì)負(fù)責(zé)人、前美國(guó)國(guó)家安全局(NSA)專家凱瑟琳·雷恩斯表示,這些行動(dòng)者據(jù)稱正在利用Telegram和Reddit作為協(xié)調(diào)平臺(tái),發(fā)布所謂攻擊截圖以示“戰(zhàn)果”,但相關(guān)信息的真實(shí)性往往需要數(shù)周甚至數(shù)月時(shí)間才能核實(shí)。
BadeSaba被黑事件為伊朗代理組織提供了一種可“反向應(yīng)用”的操作范本,以類似手法對(duì)付西方企業(yè)及其他目標(biāo)。雷恩斯指出,由于2月28日的打擊行動(dòng)幾乎瓦解了伊朗的最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層,原本統(tǒng)籌德黑蘭網(wǎng)絡(luò)行動(dòng)的指揮體系基本不復(fù)存在。
她告訴《財(cái)富》雜志:“伊朗領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層的權(quán)力真空,很可能導(dǎo)致更不可預(yù)測(cè)、更加分散的代理攻擊。”
在實(shí)際操作層面,這意味著立場(chǎng)一致的黑客行動(dòng)主義者和代理組織可能自行決定攻擊目標(biāo),而無(wú)需獲得中央授權(quán)。雷恩斯稱,如果某個(gè)激進(jìn)團(tuán)體為了“表達(dá)立場(chǎng)”而決定攻擊一家中型物流企業(yè),其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就將外溢到德黑蘭、華盛頓或紐約以外的地區(qū)。
她警告道:“主動(dòng)權(quán)掌握在Telegram群組里19歲黑客的手中,幾乎沒(méi)有任何監(jiān)督或指揮。”
因此,人工智能安全公司Andesite聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人及首席執(zhí)行官、前美國(guó)中央情報(bào)局(CIA)精銳“特別行動(dòng)中心”(Special Activities Center)負(fù)責(zé)人布萊恩·卡博表示,美國(guó)企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者必須為持續(xù)的不確定性做好準(zhǔn)備。他指出,多年來(lái),伊朗無(wú)論作為政府還是作為抵抗力量,都展現(xiàn)出極強(qiáng)的韌性。鑒于伊朗正在轟炸鄰國(guó),人們應(yīng)當(dāng)預(yù)期,伊朗除了動(dòng)用導(dǎo)彈與遍布全球的武裝代理力量之外,還將繼續(xù)釋放其強(qiáng)大的網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊能力。
曾經(jīng)擔(dān)任兩任美國(guó)中央情報(bào)局局長(zhǎng)幕僚長(zhǎng)的卡博說(shuō):“激進(jìn)且富有創(chuàng)造性的抵抗,早已融入伊朗安全體系以及整個(gè)伊斯蘭共和國(guó)的精神內(nèi)核。對(duì)于企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者以及那些負(fù)責(zé)保護(hù)企業(yè)的高層決策者而言,他們必須做好長(zhǎng)期應(yīng)對(duì)這種局面的準(zhǔn)備,并意識(shí)到?jīng)_突可能朝著不同方向演變,局勢(shì)隨時(shí)可能發(fā)生轉(zhuǎn)折。”
卡博認(rèn)為,美國(guó)與以色列的打擊削弱了伊朗的常規(guī)軍事能力,這反倒讓網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊變成了伊朗手中更有吸引力的一張牌。這種手段部署成本低、難以溯源,卻能以相對(duì)有限的投入制造巨大的心理與運(yùn)營(yíng)層面的沖擊。例如,伊朗已經(jīng)證明其能夠模仿并升級(jí)由俄羅斯首創(chuàng)的一些網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊方式。
卡博表示:“伊朗伊斯蘭共和國(guó)向來(lái)對(duì)其安全體系內(nèi)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)能力引以為傲。”這種自豪感不太可能因?yàn)楦邔宇I(lǐng)導(dǎo)遇襲身亡而消失,反而可能隨著選擇減少而得到進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化。
雷恩斯則指出,大多數(shù)企業(yè)的安全預(yù)案尚未準(zhǔn)備好應(yīng)對(duì)類似BadeSaba黑客事件。該事件在打擊行動(dòng)剛開(kāi)始之際,向數(shù)百萬(wàn)名使用該應(yīng)用程序記錄每日宗教日程的伊朗穆斯林推送通知。
她解釋道:“企業(yè)其實(shí)并未準(zhǔn)備好應(yīng)對(duì)我所說(shuō)的‘虛無(wú)主義的心理戰(zhàn)’。這種攻擊的真正目標(biāo)是員工的心理狀態(tài)與信任感。”她認(rèn)為這種行動(dòng)與旨在竊取數(shù)據(jù)或癱瘓系統(tǒng)的傳統(tǒng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊有所區(qū)別。
這種攻擊在企業(yè)層面可能表現(xiàn)為:海灣地區(qū)的員工突然收到看似緊急的信息,可能是模仿其區(qū)域負(fù)責(zé)人或首席執(zhí)行官的深度偽造語(yǔ)音,或是假借公司名義發(fā)布的撤離通知。然而,在當(dāng)?shù)匦侣勍[、互聯(lián)網(wǎng)連接極其有限的情況下,人們幾乎沒(méi)有能力核實(shí)這些信息的真?zhèn)巍?/p>
雷恩斯指出,很少有企業(yè)制定預(yù)案,以應(yīng)對(duì)事件發(fā)生后數(shù)小時(shí)內(nèi)員工面臨的現(xiàn)實(shí)處境;同時(shí),風(fēng)險(xiǎn)建模往往基于國(guó)家行為與假定的“紅線”,假設(shè)各方會(huì)避免全面戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。
她預(yù)測(cè),對(duì)于本周即將召開(kāi)會(huì)議的董事會(huì)與高管層而言,安全負(fù)責(zé)人必須回答的關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題是,業(yè)務(wù)系統(tǒng)在離線狀態(tài)下最長(zhǎng)能持續(xù)多久,以免影響到企業(yè)營(yíng)收與聲譽(yù)。
她表示:“我們關(guān)注的已經(jīng)不再是攔截率,而是更關(guān)心恢復(fù)時(shí)間。”
卡博稱,如果他本周參加董事會(huì)會(huì)議,他迫切想要知道,基于當(dāng)前的伊朗局勢(shì),企業(yè)是否處于更高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之中?如果答案是肯定的,他就會(huì)進(jìn)一步追問(wèn)已經(jīng)采取哪些措施減緩風(fēng)險(xiǎn);如果答案是否定的,他將會(huì)提出更多問(wèn)題。
他指出,管理層應(yīng)當(dāng)了解企業(yè)已經(jīng)采取哪些措施來(lái)確保業(yè)務(wù)不受威脅,弄清楚企業(yè)如何與合作伙伴及其他方合作共享如何檢測(cè)攻擊,以及在此過(guò)程中如何利用人工智能技術(shù)。
卡博重申,這并非一場(chǎng)短期內(nèi)即可化解的危機(jī),其衍生的網(wǎng)絡(luò)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也不會(huì)立即消散。
卡博說(shuō):“這場(chǎng)沖突可能出現(xiàn)諸多轉(zhuǎn)折,并朝著多個(gè)方向演變。我認(rèn)為這不是可以在幾天內(nèi)就圓滿解決的問(wèn)題。這就要求我們持續(xù)保持警惕,加強(qiáng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)防御、保護(hù)實(shí)體以及其他各類資產(chǎn)的安全。”(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:劉進(jìn)龍
As strikes hit Tehran on February 28 morning, millions of Iranians got a strange push notification on their phones. The BadeSaba Calendar prayer app, which has more than 5 million downloads, had been compromised, and the app issued alerts saying, “Help has arrived!” and called for a “People’s Army” to defend their “Iranian brothers,” according to an assessment from cyber intel firm Flashpoint. On March 1, the app sent with surrender instructions for rank-and-file members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and safe locations for protesters to gather.
Then regime loyalists quickly struck back.
According to Flashpoint, what followed on March 1 was the “most aggressive” use so far of what’s known as Iran’s “Great Epic” cyber campaign, which is a loosely coordinated group of cyber operatives under a channel called the “Cyber Islamic Resistance.” Under the group’s umbrella, various cyber attackers have shut down gas stations in Jordan, and led attacks against U.S. and Israeli military providers to destroy data as well as conduct psychological operations mimicking the BadeSaba hack.
The next 48 hours are likely to be a period of “extreme volatility” where hacktivists and proxies “take the lead in escalation to fill the vacuum left by Tehran’s central command,” Flashpoint noted in an update. These actors are allegedly using Telegram and Reddit as a coordination hub, posting screenshots of alleged attacks as proof, although it takes weeks and sometimes months to verify accuracy, said Kathryn Raines, a former NSA expert who is now a threat intel team lead at Flashpoint.
The BadeSaba hack demonstrates the template that Iranian proxy groups could now try to deploy in reverse against Western companies and others. Plus, with Iranian leadership effectively decimated by February 28’s strikes, the command structure that oversaw Tehran’s cyber operations is essentially gone, said Raines.
“The Iranian leadership vacuum is likely going to lead to more unpredictable, decentralized proxy attacks,” she told Fortune.
In practice, that means aligned hacktivists and proxy groups are making their own targeting decisions, without approval from central authorities. So if a highly aggressive group decides to hit a mid-sized logistics firm because to make a statement, the risk cascades beyond Tehran, Washington, D.C., or New York, said Raines.
“It’s in the hands of a 19-year-old hacker in a Telegram room with really no oversight or direction,” she warned.
Accordingly, U.S. business leaders need to be prepared for continued uncertainty, said Brian Carbaugh, co-founder and CEO of AI-based security firm Andesite and former director of the CIA’s elite Special Activities Center (SAC). Iranians have consistently shown over the years that they are incredibly resilient as a government and resistance force. And given that the regime is bombarding its neighbors, people should expect Iran to continue unleashing their formidable offensive cyber capabilities in addition to other aspects of national power like their missiles and armed proxies around the world, he said.
“Aggressive and creative resistance is baked into the ethos of the Iranian security apparatus and across the Islamic Republic of Iran,” said Carbaugh, who previously served as chief of staff to two CIA directors. “For business leaders and those protecting businesses and making decisions at a very high level, they need to be prepared for this to continue on for some time and for the conflict to take a number of different courses of direction and swerve around the road.”
As U.S. and Israeli attacks degrade Iran’s conventional military capabilities, cyber attacks appear more attractive, said Carbaugh. It’s low-cost to deploy, difficult to attribute, and extremely capable of creating outsized psychological and operational disruption relative to the investment required. Iran has shown that it is capable of emulating and building on cyber attack methods first shown by Russia, for example.
“The Islamic Republic has always had great pride in cyber capabilities within the security services,” said Carbaugh. That pride isn’t likely to evaporate with the loss of senior leadership, and may intensify as other options narrow.
According to Raines, most corporate security plans aren’t ready for attacks like the BadeSaba hack, which pushed a notification to potentially millions of Muslims in Iran who use the app to track daily religious schedules at the moment the strikes were starting.
“Companies aren’t really prepared for what I’ll call nihilistic psychological operations that are really meant to target the mental state and trust of their workforce,” she explained, contrasting them with attacks designed to steal data and disable systems.
It could manifest in businesses like this: Staff in the Gulf region start getting what appear to be urgent messages, perhaps deepfake audio attributed to their regional leader or CEO, or communications purportedly from the company on evacuations. But with local news offline and scant internet service, people will have very little ability to fact check anything.
Few companies have plans in place for what employees’ reality will be in the hours that follow, while risk modeling is often based on state behavior and assumed “red lines” that prevent total war, Raines noted.
For boards and C-suites convening this upcoming week, key questions for security leaders will have to do with the maximum amount of time business functions can be offline before it hits revenue and reputation, she predicted.
“We’re less interested in the block rate, and more interested in recovery time,” said Raines.
Carbaugh said if he were on a board call this week, he would want to know if the business was at an elevated level of risk based on what’s happening in Iran. If the answer is yes, he would want to know what’s being done to mitigate. If the answer is no, he would ask even more questions.
Leaders should find out what steps have been taken to ensure businesses aren’t at risk, figure out how companies have engaged with partners and others to find out how they’re detecting attacks, and how AI is currently being used in doing so, Carbaugh said.
He reiterated that this isn’t a crisis with a near-term resolution, and it translates into cyber risk that won’t immediately dissipate.
“This conflict could take many twists and turns and move in a lot of different directions,” said Carbaugh. “I don’t think this is going to be one we’re going to tidily wrap up and move on from in a few days. This will require constant vigilance and protection of our cyber networks, physical security, and all other assets.”