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          霍爾木茲海峽危機之下,“淚之門”成新焦點

          如果霍爾木茲海峽和曼德海峽同時被實質封鎖,全球供應鏈和全球經濟將面臨嚴重沖擊。

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          2026年3月27日,也門薩那,一場聲援伊朗對抗美以戰爭的抗議活動中,一名胡塞武裝士兵在警車上架設機槍執勤,身旁廣告牌上是胡塞武裝發射導彈與無人機的場景。圖片來源:Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images

          如果你之前從未聽說過霍爾木茲海峽,現在想必已有所耳聞。伊朗實際上封鎖了這條通常承載全球約20%石油天然氣運輸的水道,對全球經濟造成嚴重壓力。

          如今一些分析師警告稱,新的沖突爆發或將出現,就是曼德海峽。

          原因在于,控制也門北部大片地區并與伊朗結盟的軍事組織胡塞武裝3月28日正式參戰。伊朗戰爭爆發以來,胡賽首次向以色列發射了導彈。

          也門扼守海峽一側,胡塞武裝此前就曾襲擊過紅海的船只,在2023年底和2024年引發大規模航運混亂。

          彭博社(Bloomberg)最新報道稱,伊朗已接觸胡塞武裝,準備開展類似行動。

          以下是為何全球目光再度聚焦胡塞武裝、曼德海峽和紅海,以及第二條核心航道受阻對世界經濟意味著什么。

          曼德海峽在哪?

          曼德海峽最窄處約30公里,東北側是阿拉伯半島的也門,西側是非洲厄立特里亞及吉布提。

          海峽航行條件以兇險著稱,所以其名稱在阿拉伯語中直譯為“淚之門”(Gate of Tears)。

          該海峽戰略位置至關重要,因為與埃及的蘇伊士運河相連,船只可經紅海和亞丁灣,直接往返地中海和印度洋。

          19世紀蘇伊士運河開通之前,船只必須繞行非洲南端才能抵達兩處。

          舉個例子,一艘油輪離開沙特阿拉伯前往荷蘭,如果走紅海航線只需航行12,000公里,繞行非洲南部則需航行超過20,000公里。

          可想而知,走紅海速度也會快得多。據美國能源信息署(EIA)的數據,繞遠路從阿拉伯海到荷蘭需要34天,經紅海航線可縮短至僅需19天。

          哪些物資經此通行?

          正常情況下,全球約14%的海上貿易需途經曼德海峽。

          曼德海峽通行貨物的詳細數據較為有限,但化石燃料是主要品類。

          國際能源署(IEA)估算,2025年每天約有420萬桶原油和石油液體經曼德海峽運輸,約占全球產量的5%。

          由于大多數船只同時會通過蘇伊士運河,蘇伊士運河管理局的官方數據可清晰反映繪出紅海航運全貌。

          2025年四季度,通過蘇伊士運河的3,426艘船只中,約40%運輸化石燃料:(1,330艘油輪,88艘液化天然氣船)。

          散貨和普通貨物占了另外40%(1,339艘船),主要運輸玉米、小麥和大豆等農產品,以及煤炭和鐵礦石。集裝箱船約占總交通量的13%(459艘)。

          值得注意的是,盡管襲擊已基本停止,2023年底和2024年胡塞武裝襲擊船只以來,紅海通行船只總量還是大幅減少。

          海峽能被封鎖嗎?

          曼德海峽無法完全“封鎖”,其最窄處水域仍然相當寬闊。而且與霍爾木茲海峽不同,曼德海峽不是“死胡同”,不會出現一端封閉,僅有一個出口的情況。船只仍可通過蘇伊士運河駛往地中海。

          但這對前往亞洲的船只來說并不算安慰,那些船不得不繞行非洲,航程增加數周。

          值得一提的是,沙特早已制定避開霍爾木茲海峽的“B計劃”,即東西輸油管道。該管道連接北部的阿布蓋格和紅海沿岸的延布,為應對此次沖突,已接近滿負荷輸油。

          但從這一新出口運往亞洲的石油仍須通過曼德海峽才能避免繞遠路,也就說還是可能受到干擾。

          已有前車之鑒

          想了解胡塞武裝可能如何再擾亂航運,只需回顧最近的紅海危機。

          據國際海事組織(IMO)數據,2023年11月至2024年9月期間記錄了67起襲擊事件。部分船只遭受輕微設備損壞。另一些船只遭導彈或無人機擊中后發生嚴重火災、洪水和結構損壞。

          不過,2024年以來襲擊相對減少。嚴格來說,海峽本身從未被完全“封鎖”,危機期間始終有船只持續通行。

          僅威脅便已足夠

          胡賽可能會沿用相同戰術。但對航運公司來說,僅是襲擊的威脅就足以導致航運減緩或受限。平民船員則有生命危險。

          除此之外,保險成本可能飆升至難以承受的水平,從而事實上關閉這條航線。2024年危機前,保險成本約占船上貨物價值的0.6%。紅海危機后,比例一度高達2%。

          如果霍爾木茲海峽和曼德海峽同時被實質封鎖,全球供應鏈和全球經濟將面臨嚴重沖擊。(財富中文網)

          弗拉維奧·馬考,副教授——商業與法學院,伊迪絲科文大學

          本文從The Conversation轉載,已經過知識共享許可協議授權。

          譯者:夏林

          如果你之前從未聽說過霍爾木茲海峽,現在想必已有所耳聞。伊朗實際上封鎖了這條通常承載全球約20%石油天然氣運輸的水道,對全球經濟造成嚴重壓力。

          如今一些分析師警告稱,新的沖突爆發或將出現,就是曼德海峽。

          原因在于,控制也門北部大片地區并與伊朗結盟的軍事組織胡塞武裝3月28日正式參戰。伊朗戰爭爆發以來,胡賽首次向以色列發射了導彈。

          也門扼守海峽一側,胡塞武裝此前就曾襲擊過紅海的船只,在2023年底和2024年引發大規模航運混亂。

          彭博社(Bloomberg)最新報道稱,伊朗已接觸胡塞武裝,準備開展類似行動。

          以下是為何全球目光再度聚焦胡塞武裝、曼德海峽和紅海,以及第二條核心航道受阻對世界經濟意味著什么。

          曼德海峽在哪?

          曼德海峽最窄處約30公里,東北側是阿拉伯半島的也門,西側是非洲厄立特里亞及吉布提。

          海峽航行條件以兇險著稱,所以其名稱在阿拉伯語中直譯為“淚之門”(Gate of Tears)。

          該海峽戰略位置至關重要,因為與埃及的蘇伊士運河相連,船只可經紅海和亞丁灣,直接往返地中海和印度洋。

          19世紀蘇伊士運河開通之前,船只必須繞行非洲南端才能抵達兩處。

          舉個例子,一艘油輪離開沙特阿拉伯前往荷蘭,如果走紅海航線只需航行12,000公里,繞行非洲南部則需航行超過20,000公里。

          可想而知,走紅海速度也會快得多。據美國能源信息署(EIA)的數據,繞遠路從阿拉伯海到荷蘭需要34天,經紅海航線可縮短至僅需19天。

          哪些物資經此通行?

          正常情況下,全球約14%的海上貿易需途經曼德海峽。

          曼德海峽通行貨物的詳細數據較為有限,但化石燃料是主要品類。

          國際能源署(IEA)估算,2025年每天約有420萬桶原油和石油液體經曼德海峽運輸,約占全球產量的5%。

          由于大多數船只同時會通過蘇伊士運河,蘇伊士運河管理局的官方數據可清晰反映繪出紅海航運全貌。

          2025年四季度,通過蘇伊士運河的3,426艘船只中,約40%運輸化石燃料:(1,330艘油輪,88艘液化天然氣船)。

          散貨和普通貨物占了另外40%(1,339艘船),主要運輸玉米、小麥和大豆等農產品,以及煤炭和鐵礦石。集裝箱船約占總交通量的13%(459艘)。

          值得注意的是,盡管襲擊已基本停止,2023年底和2024年胡塞武裝襲擊船只以來,紅海通行船只總量還是大幅減少。

          海峽能被封鎖嗎?

          曼德海峽無法完全“封鎖”,其最窄處水域仍然相當寬闊。而且與霍爾木茲海峽不同,曼德海峽不是“死胡同”,不會出現一端封閉,僅有一個出口的情況。船只仍可通過蘇伊士運河駛往地中海。

          但這對前往亞洲的船只來說并不算安慰,那些船不得不繞行非洲,航程增加數周。

          值得一提的是,沙特早已制定避開霍爾木茲海峽的“B計劃”,即東西輸油管道。該管道連接北部的阿布蓋格和紅海沿岸的延布,為應對此次沖突,已接近滿負荷輸油。

          但從這一新出口運往亞洲的石油仍須通過曼德海峽才能避免繞遠路,也就說還是可能受到干擾。

          已有前車之鑒

          想了解胡塞武裝可能如何再擾亂航運,只需回顧最近的紅海危機。

          據國際海事組織(IMO)數據,2023年11月至2024年9月期間記錄了67起襲擊事件。部分船只遭受輕微設備損壞。另一些船只遭導彈或無人機擊中后發生嚴重火災、洪水和結構損壞。

          不過,2024年以來襲擊相對減少。嚴格來說,海峽本身從未被完全“封鎖”,危機期間始終有船只持續通行。

          僅威脅便已足夠

          胡賽可能會沿用相同戰術。但對航運公司來說,僅是襲擊的威脅就足以導致航運減緩或受限。平民船員則有生命危險。

          除此之外,保險成本可能飆升至難以承受的水平,從而事實上關閉這條航線。2024年危機前,保險成本約占船上貨物價值的0.6%。紅海危機后,比例一度高達2%。

          如果霍爾木茲海峽和曼德海峽同時被實質封鎖,全球供應鏈和全球經濟將面臨嚴重沖擊。(財富中文網)

          弗拉維奧·馬考,副教授——商業與法學院,伊迪絲科文大學

          本文從The Conversation轉載,已經過知識共享許可協議授權。

          譯者:夏林

          If you’d never heard of the Strait of Hormuz before, you probably have by now. Iran’s effective closure of the waterway, which usually carries about 20% of the world’s oil and gas, has put severe pressure on the global economy.

          Now, some analysts are warning a new flashpoint could emerge: the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

          That’s because on March 28, the Houthis, a military group that controls large parts of northern Yemen and is aligned with Iran, entered the war, launching missiles towards Israel for the first time since the war with Iran began.

          Yemen is situated on one side of the strait, and the Houthis have previously attacked shipping in the Red Sea, causing major disruption in late 2023 and 2024.

          Bloomberg now reports Iran has approached the Houthis to prepare for a similar campaign.

          Here’s why all eyes will be back on the Houthis, Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, and what disruption of a second major chokepoint could mean for the world economy.

          What is the Bab el-Mandeb Strait?

          The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is about 30 kilometres wide at its narrowest point. It is situated between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula to the northeast and Eritrea and Djibouti in Africa on the west.

          Its name literally means “Gate of Tears” in Arabic, after its famously treacherous sailing conditions.

          It has become so important because, along with the Suez Canal in Egypt, it allows ships to transit directly between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean by passing through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

          Before the Suez Canal’s opening in the 19th century, ships had to travel all the way around the southern tip of Africa to join these two points.

          An oil tanker leaving Saudi Arabia to go to the Netherlands, for example, only has to travel 12,000 kilometres if it goes via the Red Sea, compared with more than 20,000 kilometres going south around Africa.

          As you’d expect, that’s much faster too. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), a trip between the Arabian Sea and the Netherlands that takes 34 days the long way around is shortened to just 19 days.

          What passes through it?

          In normal times, as much as 14% of global maritime trade goes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

          Detailed data on what passes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is somewhat limited. But fossil fuels are a major component.

          The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that in 2025 about 4.2 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum liquids crossed the Bab al-Mandeb Strait per day. That’s about 5% of global production.

          Given most ships use the Suez Canal as well, official data from the Suez Canal Authority allow us to paint a detailed picture of Red Sea shipping.

          In the final quarter of 2025, about 40% of the 3,426 ships passing through the Suez Canal transported fossil fuels: (1,330 oil tankers, 88 liquefied natural gas (LNG) ships).

          Bulk and general cargo made up another 40% (1,339 ships), typically transporting agricultural commodities such as corn, wheat and soybeans, and also coal and iron ore. Container ships made about 13% of the traffic (459 ships).

          Notably, total traffic through the Red Sea has declined considerably since Houthi attacks on shipping in late 2023 and 2024, even though these attacks have largely stopped.

          Can the strait be closed?

          The Bab el-Mandeb Strait can’t be “closed” entirely. Its narrowest point is still a considerably wide waterway. And unlike the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is not a “cul-de-sac”, where the passage is closed at one end with only one way out. Ships can still exit to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal.

          That’s little comfort for those bound for Asia, which would then have to round Africa to do so, adding weeks to the journey.

          Notably, Saudi Arabia had already built a “Plan B” to avoid the Strait of Hormuz, called the East-West pipeline. This pipeline connects Abqaiq in the north with Yanbu on the Red Sea, and had already begun pumping oil at almost full capacity in response to the conflict.

          But oil bound for Asia from this new exit point still has to pass through Bab el-Mandeb to avoid the long way around, meaning it could be disrupted.

          We’ve been here before

          To get a sense of how the Houthis could disrupt shipping again, we can look to the most recent Red Sea crisis.

          According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 67 incidents were recorded between November 2023 and September 2024. Some ships only suffered minor equipment damage. But others faced severe fires, flooding and structural damage after being hit by missiles or drones.

          However, there have been relatively few attacks since 2024. And the strait was never totally “closed” per se: some ships continued to pass through throughout the crisis.

          The mere threat of attacks

          These same tactics would probably apply today. But for shipping companies, the mere threat of attacks may be enough to slow or restrict shipping. There are significant risks to civilian crew, who face a threat to life.

          Adding to this, insurance costs could become prohibitive enough to close the route in practical terms. Back in 2024, insurance costs were about 0.6% of the value of the cargo on a ship. After the Red Sea crisis, this rose as high as 2%.

          The effective closure of both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb at the same time would be severely disruptive to global supply chains and the global economy.

          Flavio Macau, Associate Dean – School of Business and Law, Edith Cowan University

          This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

          財富中文網所刊載內容之知識產權為財富媒體知識產權有限公司及/或相關權利人專屬所有或持有。未經許可,禁止進行轉載、摘編、復制及建立鏡像等任何使用。
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